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Tax Equity
ANTHONY C. INFANTIt

Uniformity breeds conformity, and conformity's
intolerance.

other face is

Zygmunt Bauman'
The starting-point of critical elaboration is the consciousness of
what one really is, and is "knowing thyself' as a product of the
historical process to date which has deposited in you an infinity of
traces, without leaving an inventory. It is necessary initially to
make such an inventory.
2
Antonio GramsCi

INTRODUCTION

Each year when I teach federal income tax, one of the
topics that I reflexively cover with my students in the first
or second class is the triad of tax policy concernsefficiency, equity, and administrability-that will inform
many of our discussions during the semester. Whether the
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I would
like to thank Dorothy Brown, Leandra Lederman, Edward McCaffery, and
Beverly Moran for their comments on drafts of this paper. I would also like to
thank those who attended my presentation of this paper at the Law & Society
Conference and the participants at the Texas Junior Legal Scholars Conference
at Texas Wesleyan University School of Law for their helpful comments. I
would like to thank the University of Pittsburgh School of Law for providing
financial support for the writing of this Article.
1. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, GLOBALIZATION: THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES 47 (1998).

2. As quoted in PETER IVES, LANGUAGE AND HEGEMONY IN GRAMSCI 79 (2004).
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topic is an objective test for deducting the cost of workrelated clothing or the propriety of taxing capital gains at
preferential rates, I have found that introducing students to
the notion that we should strive for a tax system that (1)
minimizes interference with economic decisionmaking, (2) is
fair, and (3) is easy to administer and comply with, helps
them to see tax not as a dry and arcane subject, but as one
that involves the balancing of important policy considerations
that have a real, everyday impact on all of our lives.
Evidence that others share in the belief that it is important
to introduce these tax policy concerns to students early on
in their tax education can be found in the large number of
basic 3income tax textbooks that begin with a discussion of
them.
Tax equity, the topic of this Article, has influenced not
only classroom debate, but also political debates and, to a
lesser extent, judicial application of the tax laws. 4 In
3. E.g., WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 6-9 (5th ed.
1999); JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE,
AND POLICY 117-35 (3d ed. 2004); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 27-31 (5th ed. 2005);
SANFORD M. GUERIN & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 8-14 (5th ed. 1998); MICHAEL A. LIVINGSTON,
TAXATION: LAW, PLANNING, AND POLICY, at xxxiv-xxxix (2003); LAURIE L. MALMAN
ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 8-15 (2002); PAUL R. McDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1-4
(5th ed. 2004); JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS,

AND MATERIALS 24-26 (3d ed. 2005); RICHARD A. WESTIN, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 31-35 (2002).
4. See, e.g., LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES
AND JUSTICE 12-13 (2002) (discussing the influence of tax justice in political
debates); William B. Barker, The Three Faces of Equality: Constitutional
Requirements in Taxation, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 passim (2006) (contrasting
the U.S. Supreme Court's hands-off approach to applying the Equal Protection
Clause as well as more general notions of equality in its constitutionally-based
tax decisions with the German Constitutional Court's more frequent reliance on
notions of equality in its decisions); Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes:
Fairness, Tax Policy, and the Constitution, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 421,
427-38 (2004) (asserting that while, "[i]n the legislative arena, the concepts of
fairness and utility remain fundamental to the formulation and administration
of federal tax policy," the U.S. Supreme Court has failed to employ notions of
tax equity in determining the constitutionality of taxing statutes); Henry
Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional
Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 259
passim (2006) (contrasting the U.S. Supreme Court's infrequent use of fairness
in its constitutionally-based tax decisions with the German Constitutional
Court's more frequent reliance on fairness in its decisions); Richard J. Wood,
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academic circles, however, tax equity has engendered
significant controversy. For decades, commentators have
debated the choice of progressivity (as opposed to
proportionality or regressivity) 5 as the most appropriate
means of achieving "vertical" equity in the income tax (i.e.,
of differentiating the tax burdens imposed on taxpayers
with unequal incomes).6 Of late, "horizontal" equity-the
intuitively appealing notion that taxpayers with equal
Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 421
passim (2006) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's use of horizontal and
vertical equity principles in analyzing tax issues).
5. To illustrate the concepts of progressivity, proportionality, and
regressivity, let us take the income tax as an example. A "progressive" income
tax is one in which the tax rates rise as income rises. NEWMAN, supra note 3, at
18-19. Our current income tax is progressive in the sense that the rates are
graduated; that is, the rates increase from 0%-for those with taxable incomes
less than the amount of the standard deduction plus the personal exemptionin several steps as a taxpayer's taxable income rises, until reaching the top rate
of 35%, which, in 2006, applied only to taxpayers with taxable incomes of more
than $336,550. I.R.C. § 1 (2000 & West Supp. 2007); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
DEP'T OF TREASURY, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, at 79 (2006). In contrast, a
"proportional" income tax "is one in which all taxpayers pay the same
percentage of their income." NEWMAN, supra note 3, at 17. Under a proportional
income tax, the actual amount of tax paid would rise with income; however, the
tax rate would remain the same for everyone. For example, under a
proportional income tax imposed at 10%, individual A with $10,000 of income
and individual B with $100,000 of income would pay tax at the same rate (i.e.,
10%). The two would, however, pay very different amounts of tax: A would pay
$1,000 of tax (i.e., 10% of $10,000), and B would pay $10,000 of tax (i.e., 10% of
$100,000). In other words, under a proportional income tax, B would pay ten
times as much tax as A-even though they would both pay tax at exactly the
same rate-because B has ten times as much income as A. See id. at 18. A
"regressive" income tax is one in which "higher income taxpayers would pay a
lower rate of tax than lower income taxpayers." Id. at 21. For example, to take
individuals A and B from our discussion of proportionality, B would pay less tax
than A under a regressive income tax, even though B has ten times as much
income as A.
6. See Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50
VAND. L. REV. 919, 919-20 (1997) ("Progressive taxation . . . has sparked more
than a century of controversy."). Compare Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952), with
Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation,
"Globalization," and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731 (2000). For
recent contributions to this debate, see, for example, Mirko Bagaric & James
McConvill, Stop Taxing Happiness: A New Perspective on Progressive Taxation,
2 PITT. TAX REV. 65 (2005); Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income
Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151 (2006); Joseph M. Dodge, Theories of Tax
Justice: Ruminations on the Benefit, Partnership,and Ability-to-Pay Principles,
58 TAX L. REV. 399 (2005).
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incomes should be treated equally-has also come under
fire for, among other things, its lack of independent
significance. 7 Some commentators have taken aim at both
horizontal and vertical equity, arguing that they lack
independent normative content and contribute nothing
beyond conceptual confusion to the tax policy debate.8
Yet, despite these critiques, all mention of horizontal
and vertical equity has far from disappeared from the pages
of law reviews. 9 Both "mainstream" and critical' ° tax
scholars have embraced horizontal and vertical equity in
their contributions to the tax policy literature;" indeed,
there has been some debate about whether critical tax
theory raises issues of horizontal as opposed to vertical

7. E.g., Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle,
42 NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989); Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA.
TAX REV. 191 (1992); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity: A FurtherNote, 1
FLA. TAX REV. 354 (1993); Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More,
43 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1990); see also John A. Miller, Equal Taxation: A
Commentary, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 529 passim (2000) (discussing challenges to
the concept of horizontal equity); cf. Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence
and the Ethereal Principles of Parallelismand Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS
L.J. 645, 652 (2006) ("Many persons do give weight to horizontal equity, and
even those who do not frown on unequal treatment of the same item.").
8. Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity:
The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 613, 621-22 (1993); see
also MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4, at 8, 174 (arguing that we should replace
our focus on equity in the distribution of tax burdens with a broader view of
distributive justice that evaluates taxes as part of the property rights system
that taxes help to create).
9. On February 26, 2007, I performed a search in the "U.S. Law Reviews
and Journals, Combined" database on LEXIS to ascertain the number of
articles published during the previous ten years in which the words "horizontal
equity" or "vertical equity" appeared within eight words of "tax" or "taxation."
This search returned a total of 311 hits.
10. The burgeoning area of critical tax theory fills a gap in the traditional
tax discourse by providing "serious consideration of how the tax system
exacerbates marketplace discrimination against traditionally subordinated
groups." Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction to TAXING
AMERICA 1, 1-2 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996).
11. See, e.g., Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget
and Tax Legislative Processes, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 911-12, 932 (2002); Francine
J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and
Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 48-58 (2006); Edward J.
McCaffery, A New Understandingof Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807 passim (2005);
see also infra Part II.B.2.

2008]

TAX EQUITY

1195

equity. 12 There has even been speculation that some of the
misunderstanding between these two groups of tax scholars
stems from a failure to see critical contributions in the
same tax equity light. 13 As it turns out, however, the
problem is not that "mainstream" and critical tax scholars
are talking past each other, but that critical tax scholars
attempt to frame their discussions in tax equity terms at
all.
Approaching the concept of tax equity itself from a
critical perspective, the basic thesis of this Article is that
the extant critiques of that concept miss the mark in an
important respect. Far from lacking normative content, tax
equity abounds with it. For example, as defined and applied
for purposes of income tax policy analysis, tax equity is
solely concerned with the fair treatment of individuals who
either have the same or different incomes. 14 This represents
a normative choice to consider economic differences-and
only economic differences-in determining the fairness of a
tax whose larger purpose is to allocate the burden of
funding our government and of paying for public services. 15
12. See Livingston, supra note 6, at 757-58; Richard Schmalbeck, Race and
the Federal Income Tax: Has a DisparateImpact Case Been Made?, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1817, 1819-21 (1998).
13. See Michael A. Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative Field: Putting
"CriticalTax Scholarship" in Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1792 (1998).
14. The concept of tax equity can be (and, in fact, has been) applied in other
areas of tax as well. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, One Flesh, Two Taxpayers: A
New Approach to Marriageand Wealth Transfer Taxation, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 757
passim (2004) (applying horizontal and vertical equity analysis to the estate
and gift taxes); Bridget J. Crawford, The Profits and Penalties of Kinship:
Conflicting Meanings of Family in Estate Tax Law, 3 PITT. TAx REV. 1, 59-60
(2005) (applying a horizontal equity analysis to the estate tax). The discussion
of tax equity in this Article, like the tax policy literature in general, will
primarily focus on the individual income tax, with only passing references to
other taxes. Nonetheless, much of the discussion in the text below applies
equally to other forms of taxation.
15. As Alice Abreu has observed, the tax system not only imposes burdens
on taxpayers, but also empowers individuals when it gives them "the ability to
affect either the amount of tax that will be collected or the identity of the bearer
of the resulting economic burden." Alice G. Abreu, Taxes, Power, and Personal
Autonomy, 33 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1, 6 (1996). Abreu argues that tax policy
analysts should broaden their focus to include such empowerment because (1) it
can (usually adversely) affect the progressivity of the tax system, (2) it can
affect the visibility and accountability of the tax system, and (3) it essentially
privatizes decisionmaking concerning the allocation of the tax burden. Id. at
6-9.
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Through this insidious homogenization of the population,
tax equity performs a sanitizing and a screening function;
in other words, it effectively forecloses consideration of noneconomic forms of difference (e.g., of race, ethnicity, gender,
sexual orientation, or physical ability) when determining
the appropriate allocation of societal burdens, even though
these other forms of difference have served, and continue to
serve, as the basis for invidious discrimination that already
imposes heavy burdens on its victims. Put differently, and a
bit more bluntly, tax equity, with its ostensible concern for
fairness, is often the most logical avenue for introducing
critical concerns into tax policy debates; 16 however, the
concept is defined in such a way as to bar entry to precisely
these types of concerns. It should come as no surprise, then,
that "mainstream" tax scholars tend to be so resistantand, at times, openly hostile-to critical contributions to tax
policy debates.
Before closing this Introduction, a few words on the
scope of this project are in order. My purpose in writing this
Article is not to offer an alternative definition of tax equity.
My immediate purpose is far more modest, though my
17
larger purpose is both broader and more subversive.
Initially, I hope to raise all tax scholars' consciousness of
the subtle ways in which "common sense" concepts can
influence their thinking in unexpected ways. If nothing
else, I would be quite happy if you never think of, write
about, or teach tax equity in the same way again-I
certainly know that I won't. I wish to plant a seed of doubt
in your mind that will cause you to begin to question
concepts, like tax equity, that otherwise seem normal,
natural, or plainly incontestable. If that seed takes root and
begins to grow, my further hope is that some among us
16. The other two in the triad of overarching tax policy concerns (i.e.,
efficiency and administrability) are not likely points of entry due to their
ostensible concern with the economic neutrality of the tax and the ability of
taxpayers to comply with, and the Internal Revenue Service to administer, the
tax.
17. This project actually began with an earlier article that highlighted the
artificiality of the mainstream/marginal distinction in the tax policy literature
and drew attention to the ways in which that distinction can be employed to
ignore or discredit critical contributions to the tax policy literature. Anthony C.
Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis,
Deconstruction,and the Rethinking of a Collective Identity, 26 WHITTIER L. REV.

707 (2005).
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(whether me, you, or someone else) will begin to offer
competing ideas about what makes a tax system fair-ideas
that will embrace not only fairness to the privileged among
us, but to the oppressed as well.
The remainder of this Article consists of four parts.
Part I deconstructs the concept of tax equity and explores
how its homogenizing, sanitizing, and screening functions
play out in both critical contributions to the tax policy
literature and critiques of those contributions. Part II then
anticipates several critiques of this rethinking of the
concept of tax equity and counters them. Part III explores
why, from the perspective of the dominant group, constructing
a concept of tax equity that so narrowly focuses on the
economic dimension of people is such a powerful rhetorical
move. This exploration is largely guided by Antonio
Gramsci's concept of "hegemony," which posits that a social
group dominates others through a combination of force and
control over ideas. The Conclusion consists of brief remarks
regarding this consciousness raising project.
I. MUSINGS ON THE MEANING OF "EQUITY"

A. Of Positive Public Faces
Equity. In the legal realm, we hear this word (or its
adjectival and adverbial forms, "equitable" and "equitably")
so often and in such favorable contexts that we are almost
bound to find it pregnant with positive connotations.
Indeed, in common legal usage, "equity" usually connotes
"[t]he recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement
the law as applied to particular circumstances."' 8 Thus, we
tend to associate "equity" with the good work of righting
injustices-those either that would result from an unduly
strict application of the law or for which the law provides no
remedy at all. For example, early on in law school, we all
became aware of (even if we didn't quite understand) the
largely historical difference between courts of "law" and
courts of "equity." Nonetheless, the one message that
always seemed to come through loud and clear, at least for
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (8th ed. 2004); see also 5 THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 358 (2d ed. 1989) (listing this meaning first under the
heading of uses of the word "equity" in jurisprudence).
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me, was that the equity courts were created to remedy the
inability of courts of law to do justice in certain cases. 19
Other examples of the reparative and gap-filling
connotations of the word "equity" abound. For instance, we
permit the equitable tolling of statutes of limitation "to
prevent unfairness to a diligent plaintiff. '20 We speak of the
equitable distribution of property upon divorce, as opposed
to the former approach in common law states that could
severely disadvantage homemakers by awarding property
based on how it was titled or the source of funds used for its
purchase. 21 Some courts now employ the equitable parent
doctrine "to recognize as a 'parent' an individual who has
lived with and cared for the child in the role of parent" but
who would not otherwise be considered a legal parent of
that child. 22 Similarly, courts apply the related equitable
estoppel doctrine to prevent a legal parent from denying
another's parental status. 23 Finally, though this is far from
an exhaustive list, the equitable recoupment doctrine in
federal tax law permits "a taxpayer to offset a tax collected
erroneously against a proper assessment where the two
relate to the same taxable event or, if the taxpayer sues for
a refund, allow[s] the IRS to offset an otherwise barred
deficiency against an otherwise refundable overpayment. '24
In the tax policy context, however, the word "equity"
does not bear such gap-filling or reparative connotations.
Rather, when we speak of tax equity (whether of the
horizontal or vertical variety), we are using the word
"equity" in the more general sense of "[t]he quality of being
equal or fair; fairness, impartiality; evenhanded dealing. 25
19. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH
84-86 (4th ed. 2005); see also 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 2.02 (Daniel R.

Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007) (discussing the difference in the context of
the merger of law and equity in the federal court system).
20. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 174 (2000).
21. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 4.06
reporter's note to cmt. a (2000); J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 13.02 (2006).
22. AM. LAW INST., supra note 21, § 2.03 cmt. b.

23. Id.
24. 4A BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,

ESTATES AND GIFTS

113.10(2) (2d ed. 1992).

25. 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 358 (2d ed. 1989); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 579 (8th ed. 2004).
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Even without the halo effect of the common legal usage of
the word "equity," this more general sense still carries
positive connotations of its own: 26 Anyone who devotes
herself to the task of furthering the equity of our tax system
must, by definition, be engaged in the noble task of making
that system fairer-of ensuring that all taxpayers are
treated in an impartial and evenhanded manner. Who is
likely to object to such efforts? Or, put differently, who
would argue in favor of laboring for the unfair, partial, or
biased treatment of taxpayers?
B....

and Hidden Dark Sides

1. Looking Behind the Public Face. Despite the
positive feelings that we might have when we speak of tax
equity, something a bit sinister actually lurks behind these
words. A good starting point for our exploration of this
hidden dark side is to look at the etymology of the word
"equity." The Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology indicates
that "equity" was borrowed from the Old French word
"equit6," which, in turn, was a "learned borrowing from
Latin aequitdtem (nominative aequitas), from aequus even,
just, EQUAL." '2 7 The Online Etymological Dictionary includes
in its similar entry for "equity" the meaning of the Latin
word aequitdtem, which it defines as "equality, conformity,
symmetry, fairness." 28 The BarnhartDictionaryof Etymology
further adds some useful information under its entry for the
word "equal," which it indicates was "borrowed from Latin
aequalis uniform, identical, equal, from aequus level, even,
just ....,,29

I realize that you are probably now wondering what
exactly is dark or sinister in this etymology. But, if you go
back and re-read the last paragraph in search of a theme,
you will hopefully be struck by the following words: even,
26. See, e.g., Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax
Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 645, 739-40 (2003) ("Equity is good. No one
argues that an equitable state is morally or functionally flawed.").
27. THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 338 (Robert K. Barnhart ed.,
1988).
28. ONLINE ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.ph

p?term=equity (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
29. THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY, supra note 27, at 337.
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equal, equality, conformity, symmetry, uniform, identical,
and level. All of these words connote sameness. Simply
recognizing that the word "equity" is grounded in notions of
sameness will go far in helping us to see the dark side of tax
equity.
As mentioned earlier, discussions of tax equity are
typically phrased in terms of one or both of its two subtypes: horizontal equity and vertical equity. When applied
to the income tax, horizontal equity is conventionally
defined as treating taxpayers with equal incomes equally,
and vertical equity is conventionally defined as an
appropriate differentiation in the tax burden imposed on
taxpayers with unequal incomes. 30 On its face, then, tax
equity appears to take into consideration both sameness
and difference when determining a fair allocation of the
overall income tax burden. But, as the saying goes,
appearances can be deceiving. Even though the heuristics of
horizontal and vertical equity do direct the attention of
those concerned with fairness toward the proper treatment
of taxpayers who are similarly situated and those who are
differently situated, there is only one type of sameness or
difference that counts in these explorations of tax equity:
sameness or difference of income. In other words, for
purposes of determining the fairness of the income tax, the
concept of tax equity presupposes homogeneity in the
population along all lines except one: income. 31 This
3.1.4; MURPHY & NAGEL,
30. E.g., 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24,
supra note 4, at 13; Kahn, supra note 7, at 650; McDaniel & Repetti, supra note
8, at 612; Staudt, supra note 6, at 926, 933.
31. See Theodore P. Seto & Sande L. Buhai, Tax and Disability: Ability to
Pay and the Taxation of Difference, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1053, 1073-74 (2006)
(describing how comprehensive tax base theory and progressivity-that is, the
conventional implementation of vertical equity in our tax system-have "almost
no capacity to deal with differences-other than differences in income-in
taxpayers' abilities to pay taxes"). This homogenizing influence can even be
seen in Murphy and Nagel's book, which, on its face, appears to promote a
holistic approach to formulating tax policy. Despite advocating "that societal
fairness, rather than tax fairness, should be the value that guides tax policy,"
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4, at 173, Murphy and Nagel repeatedly frame
their discussion in terms of "economic" or "distributive" justice, id. at 3, 4, 6, 7,
and they further describe the "dominant theme" of their book in the following
terms:
Private property is a legal convention, defined in part by the tax
system; therefore, the tax system cannot be evaluated by looking at its
impact on private property, conceived as something that has independent
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supposition is, of course, wholly groundless-but, as we will
see, it is far from harmless.
In reality, people are also grouped and divided along
lines other than income. Race, ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation, and disability are just a few of the notable
additional lines along which such groupings and divisions
(often invidiously) occur in everyday life. Yet, horizontal
and vertical equity efface these lines of similarity and
difference. They transform three-dimensional, flesh and
blood individuals into two-dimensional accounting statements,
reducing them to no more than the sum of their
transactions in the economic marketplace. Horizontal and
vertical equity take race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, and other characteristics into account only if, and
to the extent that, they happen to have an impact on
economic income-all other effects are simply ignored. By
assuming a far more homogeneous population than the one
that actually exists, horizontal and vertical equity screen
from the tax policy debate many issues relating to race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and disability, and
they tend to transmute any remaining issues into ones of
economic class. As we will explore more fully in Part III,
this is a powerful rhetorical move that simultaneously
sanitizes the debate over tax fairness-cleansing it of
uncomfortable discussions of racism, sexism, heterosexism,
and disability discrimination-and allows that debate to be
easily manipulated in favor of those with wealth and power.
The idea that tax equity has such effects-in other
words, that it ignores all but the economic dimension of
people-should not be surprising. Equity is just one aspect
of tax policy analysis. The other two tax policy considerations
that commentators routinely take into account are
efficiency and administrability, both of which look at tax
from an economic perspective. Efficiency is the most
unabashedly economic of the three tax policy concerns: in
existence and validity. Taxes must be evaluated as part of the overall
system of property rights that they help to create. Justice or injustice
in taxation can only mean justice or injustice in the system of property
rights and entitlements that result from a particular tax regime.
Id. at 8.
Moreover, Murphy and Nagel explicitly disclaim any discussion of invidious
discrimination in their book and confine themselves instead to discussing the
"purely economic impact" of the "justice of taxation." Id. at 25-26, 39.
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common tax parlance, "efficiency" means reducing to a
minimum the tax system's interference with economic
decisionmaking. 32 Perhaps a bit less obviously, the criterion
of administrability also embodies an economic perspective
on tax policy. Indeed, Samuel Donaldson has persuasively
argued that administrability should be viewed not as a
separate tax policy goal, but as no more than a component
of the larger goal of achieving an efficient tax. 33 In this
sense of the word, efficiency entails something akin to a
cost-benefit analysis to determine the economic viability of
a tax. As we know, an "administrable" tax is one that
minimizes the burdens on taxpayers in complying with it
and reduces the costs to the government of enforcing it. 34 A
more administrable tax is, therefore, likely to be a more
profitable tax (at least from the government's perspective),
because (1) reducing burdens on taxpayers frees them up to
dedicate the extra time to income-producing-and, ideally,
revenue-producing-endeavors
and (2) reducing the
government's cost of administering the tax increases the
revenue raised by the tax. 35 With both efficiency and
administrability impelling us to view tax policy from an
economic perspective, it should be no wonder that equity
likewise takes on a uniquely economic cast.
To pick up on Donaldson's point, equity too is not a
truly separate tax policy goal. Like administrability, equity
plays no more than a supporting role in achieving the
overarching goal of an efficient tax. 36 At times, the "neutral"
rules for achieving an efficient tax can produce anomalous

32. See Donaldson, supra note 26, at 741-42; see also 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 24, 3.2 (describing the principal areas in which an income tax may
have distortionary effects).
33. Donaldson, supra note 26, at 742-45.
34. Id. at 742-43; see also 1 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24,
(discussing complexity in the tax laws).

3.8

35. Donaldson, supra note 26, at 742-43.
36. See McDaniel & Repetti, supra note 8, at 619 ("Finally, it follows that
the index will not assist in identifying relevant trade-offs in assessing proposed
tax changes because [vertical equity] and [horizontal equity] both are derivative
concepts. Because [horizontal equity] and [vertical equity] derive their
normative base from economic judgments, values based on some theory of
justice and efficiency concerns, the relevant trade-off is between or among those
potentially conflicting fundamental judgments and values.").
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results that we find objectionable. 37 Equity serves as the
ethical or moral check-one that embodies a purely
economic or distributive view of justice-that restrains
efficiency sufficiently to render outcomes under our tax
system politically acceptable. 38 Once we realize that equity
is subordinate to efficiency in this way, equity's systematic
erasure of all but the economic dimension
of individuals
39
nearly becomes a foregone conclusion.
2. Manifestations of the Dark Side in the Critical Tax
Literature. The effects of framing arguments in tax equity
terms can be seen in the critical tax literature. In this
section, I present a series of examples from that literature
to illustrate the subtle influence that tax equity has on the
arguments made by critical tax scholars. Drawing on the
discussion in the previous section, these examples illustrate
the homogenizing and sanitizing effects of tax equity, the
screening function of tax equity, and how tax equity is
subsumed by efficiency concerns.
But, before embarking on this discussion, I would like
to be clear that I am making no substantive critiques of, or
comments on, the articles discussed here. My purpose is
merely to demonstrate the subtle, yet pernicious effects
37. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 195 (1997) (describing, for
example, how an optimal tax approach would dictate taxing a dedicated child
working to support an ill parent more than a beachcomber because the child's
attachment to labor is relatively inelastic compared to that of the beachcomber);
see also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income
Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 486-87 (1987)
(indicating that economic analysis "lends a patina of neutrality, because
economics-particularly neoclassical economics-is viewed by many noneconomists
(and even by some economists) as a 'science,' and therefore as factual and
objective").
38. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4, at 7-8, 12-13, 188-90 (speaking of
the role of moral ideas in legitimating our economic system and mentioning
horizontal and vertical equity as the historical means of exploring the moral
aspects of the tax system); Miller, supra note 7, at 545 ("The view that equality
is an empty idea rests on an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the level of
precision required in order for equality to have meaning. The idea that we
should rely on market efficiencies to resolve equity concerns is a second best
solution. Broad acceptance of either view may serve to unwisely loosen the
restraints on tax policy that are at the core of a politically and morally
acceptable tax system.").
39. I am not suggesting in this discussion that efficiency concerns are
unimportant in tax policy debates; rather, my point throughout this Article is
that efficiency should not be the only concern that is addressed in those debates.
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that can result from framing a critical analysis in tax equity
terms. With this clarification in mind, we can now turn our
attention to the critical tax literature.
a. Equity Subsumed by Efficiency. The manner in
which equity is quietly subsumed by the overarching goal of
efficiency is best shown by example. In his book Taxing
Women, Edward McCaffery accessibly describes the different
tax pressures placed on lower-, middle-, and upper-income
women. 40 McCaffery provides a compelling depiction of a
tax system that is unfair to women because it "pushes
against stable families at the lower-income levels, against
working wives at the upper-income ones, and, by limiting
satisfactory options, against the many families in
between." 41 He explores in detail both the historical
development of our deeply gendered tax system and the
practical impact of that system on women's decisions to
enter or exit the labor market. 42 After making a detailed
and quite convincing case that historical biases have
translated themselves into palpable social injustice,
McCaffery found hope for combating the biases of our
gendered tax system in "a standard idea in public finance
economics, the theory of 'optimal tax,' which . . .has long
recommended the strongest practical proposal
[in
McCaffery's] book: tax married women less and married
men more." 43
Unsurprisingly, as McCaffery explains, "[o]ptimal tax is
concerned with 'utility' and 'wealth maximization,' with the
economic ideal of 'efficiency.' 4 4 At bottom, optimal tax
theory's recommendation to tax married women less than
married men is based on married women's more elastic
attachment to paid labor. That is to say, because married
men will continue to work even when their wages are
40. MCCAFFERY, supra note 37.

41. Id. at 1.
42. Id. at 11-160.
43. Id. at 164. In view of the focus of this Article, it is worth noting that
Nancy Staudt opened her review of McCaffery's book with the following
sentence: "Edward McCaffery's important new book, Taxing Women, explores
the convergence between economic and feminist theory in the tax context."
Nancy C. Staudt, The Theory and Practice of Taxing Difference, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 653, 653 (1998) (reviewing MCCAFFERY, supra note 37).
44. MCCAFFERY, supranote 37, at 164 (emphasis added).

2008]

TAX 9

UTY

1205

reduced by taxes-and may actually respond by working
more to make up the difference-while married women
often respond to taxation by exiting the paid workforce in
favor of unpaid (and untaxed) domestic work in the home, it
is more efficient (i.e., less distorting) to tax married men
than it is to tax married women. 45 Coincidentally, this also
happens to be a more equitable result because it shifts some
of the psychological burden of having to choose between
working46in the home or in the paid labor force from women
to men.

Interestingly, McCaffery turns to economic efficiency to
save the day because "optimal tax theory should help us to
see the problems of taxing women in a better, brighter light,
to generate reform proposals, and to see that this is not just
a matter of one set of modern 'liberal' preferences being set
up against earlier, more 'conservative' ones."47 Economics
"also allows the criticism of the status quo to avoid charges
of wanton social engineering-of the replacement of
traditional family values with newfangled liberal ones.
Optimal tax theory gives a solid, more or less 'objective'
groundwork for criticizing the way we do things."48 In other
words, economics frees us from value-laden discussions of
tax fairness along the lines of race, ethnicity, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, and/or other characteristics; it
provides us with a sorely needed "neutral" vantage point
from which to survey the tax terrain and to determine
whether any changes should be made to the tax rules. 49
Viewed as neutral ground, economics becomes the ideal
means for achieving equity: "Economics is best understood
as being about means, or instrumental reasoning; our ends
have to come from elsewhere. What better place than the
goal of equal concern and respect for all of our citizens?
Shouldn't that come first?" 50 In this passage, we see how
efficiency and equity become fused in the tax policy debate.
We are told that the goal of equity is best achieved through
45. See id. at 170-84, 187-91.
46. Id. at 190-91, 193, 200-01.
47. Id. at 168.
48. Id. at 165.
49. This, of course, is another illustration of the sanitizing effect of framing
an analysis in tax equity terms, which is explored more fully infra Part I.B.2.c.
50. MCCAFFERY, supra note 37, at 169-70.
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the medium of efficiency. The means, however, quickly
swallow up the ends. As the overarching concern in tax
policy analysis, efficiency soon takes on the primary role,
with equity relegated to the supporting role of an ethical or
moral check that fetters efficiency just enough to ensure
that it does not produce anomalous (and politically
unacceptable) results:
A large problem for social theory has been figuring out the
means to get from here to there [i.e., to a more even sharing of
domestic work]. Just asking for men to do more around the house,
or crying out for institutional answers like better part-time work,
does not seem to be doing the trick. Mild legislative solutions, such
as family leave laws, have been ineffective and may even be
counterproductive. But tax might just do it. We have seen
repeatedly that tax has a unique power to motivate. And, lo and
behold, optimal tax theory is telling us that taxing men more is
exactly what society ought to be doing, if it cares about utility or
social wealth. It should so care, especially when justice and
51
fairness go hand in hand with the economist's advice.

b. Homogenizing Effect. As mentioned above, once
we recognize how efficiency subsumes equity, equity's
systematic erasure of all but the economic dimension of
individuals nearly becomes a foregone conclusion. Again, an
example will help to illustrate the point. In their
groundbreaking study of "whether the Internal Revenue
Code [(Code)] systematically favors whites over blacks," 52
Beverly Moran and William Whitford hypothesized
that even if income is held constant, the Internal Revenue Code
systematically disfavors the financial interests of blacks. We [i.e.,
Moran and Whitford] believe that, even at the same incomes, the
typical black and the typical white lead different lives, largely as a
result of the American history of racial subordination. These
53
different lives, we hypothesize, trigger different tax results.

Moran and Whitford thus actively embraced the
heuristic of horizontal equity in their study.5 4 Cabined in by
51. Id. at 201 (emphasis added).
52. Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal
Revenue Code, 1996 WIs. L. REV. 751, 751.
53. Id. at 757.
54. See id. at 753 & n.10; see also Beverly I. Moran, Exploring the Mysteries:
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this concept, Moran and Whitford were confined to
considering race only insofar as it affects the enjoyment of
tax benefits because of its association with differing
patterns of consumption, investment, or participation in the
labor market by otherwise similarly-situated individuals. 55
Thus, horizontal equity ensured that race would be
important only if, and to the extent that, it somehow
manifested itself in economic transactions.
More troubling, however, was the fact that, especially
in their discussion of wealth and home ownership,
horizontal equity caused race to be important only when it
happened to coincide 56 with class (i.e., economic) concerns.
As described below, 57 under intersectional theory, it is
generally thought that when multiple axes of disadvantage
intersect-for example, when race and class intersect in the
case of low-income African American men or when race and
class and gender intersect in the case of low-income African
American women-these multiple axes of disadvantage can
produce an effect that is greater than the sum of the
separate disadvantages. 58 In contrast, the concept of tax
equity does not allow for the multiplication of disadvantages;
instead, it works in the opposite direction toward the
reduction of disadvantages. Thus, for tax equity purposes,
race is not considered as a separate axis of disadvantage in
addition to class. Rather, race becomes redundant under
the concept of tax equity-it is only important to the extent
that it coincides with, and serves as a proxy for, economic
59
class.
Can We Ever Know Anything About Race and Tax?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1629,

1635-36 (1998).
55. Moran & Whitford, supra note 52, at 753-55.
56. I have carefully and consciously chosen to use the word "coincide" here
rather than "intersect," because, as described in the next few sentences of the
text above, the homogenizing effect of tax equity is much different from the
effect of multiple axes of disadvantage described in the literature on
intersectionality. See infra Part II.B.
57. See infra Part II.B.
58. See infra note 169.

59. This discussion is in no way meant to imply that class concerns are
unimportant-my point throughout this Article is that they are relevant, but by
no means the only concerns that are relevant when assessing the fairness of a
tax. It is worth nothing here that, as we will explore further in Part III.B, even
with its professed focus on class concerns, tax equity seems to better serve the
interests of those at the top than those at the bottom of the economic ladder.
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Let's turn back now to Moran and Whitford's article for
an illustration of this effect. Moran and Whitford found that
African Americans derive little benefit from the realization
requirement, the § 1014 fair market value basis rule, the
exclusion for gifts and bequests, and the preferential capital
gain rates:
The data on blacks and wealth tells us that blacks own very
little wealth and that this lack of wealth is at least partially
responsible for the continuing black/white wealth gap. Blacks
inherit very little wealth and they do not acquire very much more
during their lifetimes. As a consequence, blacks receive very little
benefit from the[se] Code sections ....

In particular, blacks are

much less likely than whites to own assets, such as stocks and
bonds, that benefit from the realization requirement, a necessary
prerequisite to benefiting from the stepped up basis at death and a
usual prerequisite
to benefiting from the favorable capital gains
60
tax rates.

Moran and Whitford found this wealth effect to be less
pronounced in the area of homeownership because "many
blacks do own homes that appreciate in value"; 61 however,
"while blacks benefit, whites benefit even more. White
homes appreciate more, and hence receive more favorable
treatment of gains from investments in homes. Moreover,
because white homes are more valuable, on average whites
benefit more than blacks from the deductions for home
mortgage interest and property taxes." 62 In each of these
passages, race quite clearly counts only because it63 coincides
with economic class: race essentially equals class.
Throughout the course of their study, Moran and
Whitford used the metaphor of a "Black Congress" to
suggest ways in which the Code might be changed to better
serve "the interests of blacks as a group. '64 Tellingly, Moran
60. Moran & Whitford, supra note 52, at 779.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 780.
63. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Tax Treatment of Children: Separate but
Unequal, 54 EMORY L.J. 755, 802-05 (2005) (describing how academics who
consider the racial implications of the earned income tax credit generally
proceed on the assumption that "Blacks are disproportionately poor and more
likely than Whites to be eligible for the EITC"-in other words, that race equals
class).
64. Moran & Whitford, supra note 52, at 758.
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and Whitford pointedly state in their conclusion that
"[a]nyone who wished to shift more of the tax burden away
from lower income persons and towards the more wealthy
would tend to favor" the changes that 65
their metaphorical
Code.
the
to
make
might
Congress
Black
c. Sanitizing Effect. Closely related to the
homogenizing effect of tax equity is its sanitizing effect on
the tax policy debate. Tax equity rids that debate of difficult
discussions about race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, and/or other forms of invidious discrimination by
forcing those discussions to be carried out in ostensibly
"neutral" economic terms. Once again, I will illustrate my
point through the mediui of examples.
In 1996, Congress amended Code § 104 to exclude from
gross income only damages received on account of "physical"
injuries or sickness.6 6 Shortly after Congress amended §
104, Karen Brown examined the race-, gender-, and workerbased biases of this amendment, which was intended to
make employment discrimination awards taxable. 67 Brown
argued that this amendment stemmed from Congress'
failure to appreciate the (primarily economic) harms caused
by job discrimination. 68 As a result, Brown saw a violation
of horizontal equity in this differential treatment of
physical and non-physical injuries:
In the service of bias, Congress has enacted a version of section
104(a)(2) that will result in the dissimilar treatment of similarly
situated persons, a violation of the widely accepted doctrine of
horizontal equity in tax policy analysis. Injured individuals are not
treated similarly. Those who are physically harmed may recover
all damages awards tax-free. Those injured by employment bias
may recover nothing tax-free except reimbursed medical expenses.
As demonstrated above, the physical/non-physical dichotomy
adopted in amended section 104(a)(2) guarantees disparate and
disadvantageous treatment of recoveries for the physical and
emotional harms to workers in job bias cases. The disparate
65. Id. at 801.
66. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605,
110 Stat. 1755, 1838-39 (codified at I.R.C. § 104 (2000)).
67. Karen B. Brown, Not Color- or Gender-Neutral:New Tax Treatment of
Employment DiscriminationDamages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 223,
228, 243-49 (1998).

68. Id. at 254-55, 268.
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treatment may occur, in general, because these
types of harms to
69
workers are ignored in the 1996 amendment.

By its very nature, horizontal equity analysis requires a
benchmark that can be used for purposes of comparison and
contrast. In the context of amended § 104, Brown naturally
adopted damages awarded for physical injuries as that
benchmark, and her discussion then necessarily centered on
consideration of whether the harms caused by denying
individuals "equal opportunity to succeed on their jobs as a
result of their gender or race" 70 are as "real" as physical
injuries that might impair (or even temporarily or
permanently prevent) job performance. 71 Accordingly, for
purposes of horizontal equity analysis, race and gender
discrimination became relevant only to the extent that their
(primarily economic) harm could be quantified and
analogized in "neutral" terms to a benchmark with which
the mainstream was comfortable.
More to the point, however, is Brown's argument that
employment discrimination awards should be excluded
from an employee's gross income as a reimbursement of an
otherwise deductible business expense. 72 Brown argued
that the costs of working in a discriminatory workplace are
no less a cost of producing income than any other business
expense. 73 Yet, while an employee can exclude a
reimbursement for purchasing office supplies, she cannot
exclude a reimbursement for the costs of working in a
discriminatory environment. 74 Once viewed in this light,
the failure to exclude employment discrimination awards
from gross income creates something akin to a "parallelism"
problem-one that raises vertical, rather than the typical
horizontal, equity issues. 75 The problem lies in the fact that
the same payment is treated differently in the hands of the
employer than it is in the hands of the employee. In the
69. Id. at 260 (footnote omitted).
70. Id. at 254.
71. Id. at 254-57.
72. Id. at 265; see Treas. Reg. § 1.62-2(c)(4) (as amended in 2003).
73. Brown, supra note 67, at 261, 264.
74. Id. at 263 & n.205.
75. See generally Kahn, supra note 7 (discussing parallelism as a horizontal
equity issue).
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hands of the employer, the payment of an employment
discrimination damage award is a deductible business
expense under § 162; however, in the hands of the
employee, that same payment is included in gross income
even though it is really a reimbursement for the costs of
working in a discriminatory environment and, therefore, of
producing her wage income. 76 This differential treatment
raises a vertical equity (i.e., economic class) issue because it
results in the over-taxation of workers and the undertaxation of employers. 77 It is worth noticing that, through
this tax equity analysis, employment discrimination on the
basis of race or gender has been transformed into just
another "cost" of doing business-a cost the deductibility of
which can now be debated in the sanitized jargon 7of
tax
8
expenditures and the comprehensive income tax base.
More recently, Dorothy Brown has used empirical data
to disprove the general perception that the earned income
tax credit (EITC) disproportionately benefits African
Americans. 79 With the debunking of this myth, Brown has
prevailed upon tax policy analysts to devote their attention
to the class-based discrimination against low-income
children that is embodied in the differences between the
terms and implementation of the EITC and those of the
child tax credit.80 Brown has also advocated disseminating
this empirical data regarding the EITC-eligible population
as a means of shoring up support for general reform of the
credit (particularly to remedy its excessive complexity and
to reduce the disproportionate targeting of EITC recipients
for audit).81
In making these arguments, Brown relied upon interest
convergence theory and recognized that expurgating race
from the tax policy debate (i.e., recasting the debate as
primarily or exclusively affecting whites) is the only way to
move debate about reforming the EITC forward. For
instance, she expressed hope that,
76. See Brown, supra note 67, at 264.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 261-63.
79. Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 790 (2007); Brown, supra note 63.
80. Brown, supra note 63, at 763, 765-92.
81. Brown, supra note 79, at 827-31.
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[o]nce the empirical data is disseminated, tax policy efforts can be
marshaled to ensure that low-income children have the same tax
advantages available to middle-income children. EITC reform is
necessary to assist all low-income families, especially if it is
discovered that they are being treated separately and unequally
under the tax laws because 82of erroneous perceptions held by
policymakers about their race.

Or, as she has also put it, "[o]nce the low-income
taxpayer credit is 'properly' raced, and viewed as primarily
benefiting whites," 83 we will be able to see "how taking
account of race can help us move past it and help lowincome taxpayers regardless of race."84 In either case,
Brown's hope stems from the possibility of sanitizing the
tax policy debate by shifting the focus away from racial
stigma and toward what appear to be purely class-based
concerns.
d. Screening Function. Tax equity, through its
homogenization of individuals and sanitization of the tax
policy debate, also serves an important screening function.
Merely framing a critical discussion in tax equity terms can
often scuttle an attempt to raise and address concerns
relating to race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation,
disability, and/or other non-economic characteristics. For
example, discussions of the tax treatment of same-sex
couples normally approach the question either explicitly or
implicitly from a horizontal equity perspective.8 5 Typically,
these articles contrast the tax treatment of same-sex
couples with that of different-sex married couples and
argue that, for the sake of "full tax equity," same-sex
couples should be put on "equal footing" with different-sex
married couples.8 6
82. Brown, supra note 63, at 763 (footnote omitted).
83. Brown, supranote 79, at 799.
84. Id.
85. E.g., Patricia A. Cain, Death Taxes: A Critique from the Margin, 48
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 677, 678 (2000); Christopher T. Nixon, Should Congress Revise
the Tax Code to Extend the Same Tax Benefits to Same-Sex Couples as Are
Currently Granted to Married Couples?: An Analysis in Light of Horizontal
Equity, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 41 (1998); Jonathan Brophy, Comment, Death Is
Certain, Are Taxes?: Another Argument for Equality for Same-Sex Couples
Under the Code, 34 Sw. U. L. REV. 635, 646-53 (2005).
86. Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Laws, 1 TUL.
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In her work, Patricia Cain has contended that same-sex
couples are similarly situated to different-sex married
couples for tax purposes because they "consider themselves
just as committed as married couples and [their] household
is just as much a single economic unit. 87 In the context of a
critique of the estate tax from a lesbian and gay
perspective, Cain put the point even more forcefully:
Based on a recent scholarly survey of unmarried couples, it is
fair to conclude that same-sex couples share ownership of assets at
a much higher rate than opposite-sex unmarried couples. The
result is not surprising. Married couples are more likely to share
ownership of assets than any other group. Since same-sex couples
cannot marry even though they may want to, that group is likely
to include couples who are more committed than unmarried
opposite-sex couples, all of whom have elected against marriage.
Thus the joint ownership habits amongst couples who want to get
married, but cannot, should be closer demographically to the joint
ownership experiences and desires of married couples.
The stories I have presented in this section reveal themes of
commitment, financial interdependence, joint ownership, and
sharing of responsibilities, both personal and financial. They are
consistent with the surveys that show a significant number of gay
and lesbian couples favor the pooling of both income and assets.
The stories also show that attitudes about money may affect how
individual partners manage their financial affairs or contribute to
joint ownership. But, in the end, the stories support the concept
that lesbian and gay couples are economic units that function
to improve the lives of the individual partners through a system
88
based on tacit understanding, trust, and financial interdependence.

Seen through the prism of horizontal equity, this
argument is not really about sexual orientation
discrimination, but about determining the appropriate
taxable unit and then applying that definition uniformly.8 9
And, further evidencing horizontal equity's inflexibly
economic approach to determining when taxpayers are
similarly situated, the argument is not that same-sex
couples are an appropriate taxable unit because they are
exactly like married, different-sex couples in every respect
J.L. & SEXUALITY 97, 100, 131 (1991).

87. Id. at 130-31.
88. Cain, supra note 85, at 689-90 (footnotes omitted).
89. See Cain, supranote 86, at 100.
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(notwithstanding the passing references to personal
commitment and sharing of responsibilities), but rather
that same-sex couples are an appropriate taxable unit
because they appear to have the same propensity as
married, different-sex couples to act as a single economic
unit. When the focus is shifted from the social category of
couples and their commitments to each other to the
economic category of single "units," the definition of the
appropriate taxable unit cannot be confined to committed
couples, whether same-sex or different-sex, but will
logically apply to any group of individuals, however large or
small, so long as they pool their finances. 90 Severed from its
roots, the question is no longer one of social justice, but one
of economic groupings of people and the need to achieve
parity between those groupings.
To more fully illustrate this point, let's briefly consider
Cain's article critiquing the estate tax from a lesbian and
gay perspective. In that article, Cain put forth seven
different proposals for reforming the estate tax to address
the inequitable treatment of same-sex couples. 91 At the
same time, Cain hoped that her proposals might arrive at a
more realistic estate tax treatment of families (i.e., one that
avoids the extremes of (1) treating everyone who is married
as a single economic unit regardless of the extent to which
they actually blend their finances and (2) treating everyone
who is unmarried as an individual regardless of the extent
to which they actually blend their finances with others).
Cain's proposals included, among others, repealing the
estate tax, raising the estate tax exemption, treating samesex couples the same as married couples for tax purposes,
and imposing the estate tax only once each generation. Yet,
she described her last proposal-the creation of a "personal
tax partnership"-as perhaps the fairest of all. 92 Under this
proposal, any two persons who wished to commingle their
finances could form a "personal tax partnership" that would
90. See also Shari Motro, A New "I Do": Towards a Marriage-NeutralIncome
Tax, 91 IowA L. REV. 1509, 1551 (2006) (advocating the extension of income-

splitting to all couples that act as a single economic unit, regardless of whether
they are married and regardless of whether the members of the couple are of
the same or different sexes, but admitting that, "[a]s a matter of tax policy,
there is no reason to limit the economic unity option to pairs").
91. Cain, supra note 85, at 701-07.
92. Id. at 707.

2008]

TAX EQUITY

1215

permit them to transfer property to each other free of estate
tax upon the termination of the partnership (i.e., at the
death of one of the partners). 93 Cain found it difficult,
however, to justify imposing any limits on the persons who
could create such a partnership:
A primary initial issue is how to limit the use of such
arrangements. For example, who should be permitted to create
such tax partnerships and should they be limited to two persons?
Should we, for example, only allow intimate committed partners?
Or, should we allow siblings or other family members to form such
partnerships? If the driving principle
is shared property, why limit
94
the partnership to two persons?

Struggling with the need to stave off possible abuse,
Cain entertained the possibility of imposing a cohabitation
requirement and/or a generational requirement on their
formation. 95 She also affirmatively decided to limit her
proposal to96two-person partnerships in order to make it
"workable." Nonetheless, whatever the results, it is Cain's
struggle itself that concerns us. Although her immediate
focus was on remedying the estate tax problems faced by
same-sex couples and her secondary focus was on arriving
at an appropriate estate tax treatment for families, Cain
was unable to address her proposal to the needs of either
committed couples or families because tax equity's
blinkered focus on economic circumstances made any
attempt to confine the proposal to these groups arbitrary
and indefensible. Even attempts to draw the proposal
narrowly enough to avoid blatant abuse of the Code were
rendered difficult, if not impossible, by the logical need to
achieve economic parity for all. In the end, the proposal
became unwieldy and unworkable because Cain and tax
equity were working at cross-purposes: she in a good faith
attempt to achieve "substantive justice"97 for same-sex
couples, and it in an attempt to scuttle talk of justice with
an unbending focus on economics.

93. Id. at 704-07.
94. Id. at 705.
95. Id. at 706.
96. Id. at 705.
97. Id. at 678.
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3. . . . and in the Comments of Its Critics. A 1998
symposium issue of the North CarolinaLaw Review collects
a number of pieces critiquing applications of critical tax
theory. 98 Many of these critiques lay bare the effects of tax
equity's economic approach to fairness. 99 In these critiques,
one can detect the homogenizing and sanitizing effects of
tax equity, view its screening function at work, and once
again watch equity swallowed up by notions of efficiency.
In his lead article for the symposium, Lawrence
Zelenak critiqued Moran and Whitford's choice of a
comprehensive income tax base as a starting point for
analyzing whether the Code is biased against African
Americans. 100 He argued that, given the hybrid incomeconsumption tax that we actually have, one could just as
easily choose a consumption tax as the baseline for
analysis. Zelenak then asserted that, were they to consider
our current system's deviations from a consumption tax
baseline, Moran and Whitford would be bound to conclude
that our tax system is biased against whites because
investment
income is
"almost certainly" realized
disproportionately by whites and our current system's
taxation of such income is a suspect deviation from a
consumption tax baseline.101 Having embraced the
homogenizing effects of tax equity (i.e., having essentially
equated race with economic class), Zelenak declared a
stalemate:
My view is that it makes no sense to search the Code for hidden
racial bias from either starting point. The arguments between
income tax and consumption tax proponents are close to a
standoff, both intellectually and politically. Given that standoff,
there is no reason to privilege either extreme position as the
proper starting point in a search for hidden discrimination.
Without a good reason to start from either extreme, there is no
reason to accuse the actual hybrid tax of discrimination against

98. Symposium, Critical Tax Theory: Criticism and Response, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1519 (1998).

99. See Brown, supranote 63, at 808-10.
100. Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1521, 1563-66 (1998).

101. Id. at 1565.
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Not content with this economic tit-for-tat, Zelenak
bolstered his argument for screening race out of the tax
policy debate by asserting that anyone attempting to
achieve the best possible real world tax system might
combine aspects of an income and a consumption tax to
create what he referred to as a "normative" tax base. 103 In
this hypothetical world, the baseline would be the
normative tax base (rather than a purely income or
consumption tax base). For any given provision, "[e]ither
the provision is normative, or it is not. If the provision is
right, it makes no sense to examine it for racial bias
relative to some alternative wrong approach. If the
provision is wrong, it should be repealed regardless of its
racial effects."'1 4 According to Zelenak, "[t]he cold logic of
those two possibilities indicates there is never a reason to
examine a provision for racial effects."'10 5 This logic
certainly leaves me cold. It sounds as if there is no place for
race in tax policy analysis because whatever tax system the
(white) majority creates is presumptively the correct
system, unless and until the (white) majority decides that
they were mistaken in some respect.
In his contribution to the symposium issue, Richard
Schmalbeck also commented on Moran and Whitford's
article. However sympathetic Schmalbeck's critique might
be, it is quite clear that his thinking was thoroughly
influenced by the homogenizing effect of tax equity:
In fact, when I first read the article, my mind was headed down a
track quite different from the authors', which I can summarize
with the following competing chain of observations: (a) by far the
most salient socioeconomic characteristicfor purposes of assessing
income tax burdens is income itself; (b) African-Americans are
dramaticallyunderrepresentedin high- and middle-income groups
and overrepresented in the lowest income groups; (c) our personal
income tax, whatever its faults, is in the end significantly

102. Id.
103. Id. at 1566-67.
104. Id. at 1567.
105. Id. But even Zelenak would not go quite that far; he would allow
arguments based on race to be used in the political arena "to overcome
legislative inertia." Id.
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progressive;from which it follows that (d) despite the details of the
tax situations Moran and Whitford analyze, the bottom-line
must surely and substantially favor
arithmetic of tax burdens
06
African-Americans.1

And just a few pages later, Schmalbeck considered the
possibility that both Moran and Whitford's horizontal
equity critique of the income tax and his vertical equity
response (quoted immediately above) might be correct:
Surely African-Americans-like any other taxpayers-are entitled
to a tax system that reasonably satisfies both standards of equity
[i.e., horizontal and vertical]. From an overall policy perspective, it
is entirely appropriate to say that both forms of equity are
essential and that achievement of one sort of equity is never an
adequate substitute for the highest practicable achievement of the
other. To put it more concretely in terms of this debate, the
prevailing sense of vertical equity appears to reflect the view that
low-income taxpayers should hardly be subject to the income tax
at all and that middle-income taxpayers should be subject only to
relatively light taxation. This is a policy that is presumably not
influenced to any significant degree by considerations of race. If
African-Americans turn out to be the beneficiaries of such a view, it
is because they are relatively poor, not because they are black. It
remains true that, to the degree that African-Americans do rise
above the lower ranks of the economy, they are entitled to the
benefits of horizontally equitable tax laws. 107

James Bryce approached Moran and Whitford's analysis
from a far less charitable position. Also embracing the
construct that race equals class, Bryce turned vertical
equity into a sword when he argued that, at best, Moran
and Whitford had
discovered a few tiny truths at the cost of overlooking the giant
truth: The Code discriminates against whites. The progressive
rate structure results in whites paying most of the federal income
tax. This discrimination has increased in recent years as Congress
has added a complex tangle of phase-outs to the Code explicitly to
taxpayers, who are predominantly white, of
deprive high-income
10 8
various benefits.

106. Schmalbeck, supra note 12, at 1818 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 1820-21 (emphasis added).
108. James D. Bryce, A CriticalEvaluation of the Tax Crits, 76 N.C. L. REV.
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Bryce asserted that Moran and Whitford would be far
better off if they got "straight to the point and argue[d] that
the existing rate structure is insufficiently progressive and
that the Code discriminates against blacks (and other lowincome groups) by not taking much more of the income of
high-income (disproportionately white) taxpayers for
redistribution." 01 9
In his contribution to the symposium, Steve Johnson
found appeals to the "classical liberal value of equality"for example, arguments that, on principle, same-sex couples
should be treated the same as different-sex couples-to be
wanting. 110 In its place, Johnson articulated a clearly
economic test of horizontal equity. Johnson argued that, for
a claim of discrimination to be "fully persuasive," a critical
tax scholar must show that
(1) There is some particular Code feature that operates to the
substantial disadvantage of some group. Typically, this would
involve showing that, as a result of the Code feature, group
members pay proportionately more tax than non-members.
(2) The offending Code feature is not compensated for by other
aspects of the Code that disproportionately benefit the group in
question. That is, there must be an on-balance or on-net
evaluation, a showing that the unfavorable Code aspects hurt
group members more than the favorable Code aspects help them.
(3) The appropriate way to redress the problem would be
changing the Code, rather than changing non-tax rules or
practices.
(4) A reasonable solution exists. That is, a way exists to reform
the offending Code section, and that way is technically feasible,
1
efficacious, and unlikely to create other serious problems.

After measuring two articles on the tax treatment of
same-sex couples against this standard, Johnson concluded
that "scholars and advocates have not yet convincingly
demonstrated that, on net, the failure to recognize same-sex
1687, 1689 (1998).
109. Id. at 1691.
110. Steve R. Johnson, Targets Missed and Targets Hit: CriticalTax Studies
and Effective Tax Reform, 76 N.C. L. REV.1771, 1773-74 (1998).
111. Id. at 1771-72.
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couples as married hurts them by imposing substantially
higher federal income tax liabilities on them. 11 2 Johnson
(in
thus provides us with another example of how efficiency
3
the guise of a cost-benefit analysis) subsumes equity."
Perhaps most to the point in demonstrating how plainly
inhospitable traditional tax analysis is to critical
perspectives, Charles Galvin maintains in his succinct
contribution to the symposium issue that
[a] tax system should be neutral in its effect on each citizen's
decisionmaking. Therefore, assuming a democratic ideal of a free
society with equal opportunity for all, the framers of tax policy
should strive for a system that is blind as to gender and color. I
agree with Professor Zelenak that any attempt to tailor the system
to meet the criticisms of feminists or racial groups rapidly becomes
a nightmare of dilemmas that are just not resolvable. One needs
only to observe lifestyles of friends, colleagues, neighbors, and
relatives, and one becomes keenly aware that to design a tax
regime to meet the gender and race considerations of each case
would create a statutory maze of confusion many times worse
confounded than the current system. Furthermore, trade-offs
between different feminist goals make simple solutions impossible.
A better course is to achieve neutrality by the attainment as
comprehensive model or
nearly as possible of a pure Haig-Simons
11 4
a pure consumed income model.

To paraphrase Galvin's article: Taking the reality of
invidious discrimination into account makes tax policy
analysis far too complicated and messy. Tax policy analysis
is much simpler and tidier when the possibility of
discrimination is flatly ignored, when we assume that the
real and ideal are one and the same, and when we focus
only on the economic aspects of taxation with which we are
far more comfortable.

112. Id. at 1779.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35; see also Anthony C. Infanti,
The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763
passim (2004) (discussing how, by focusing on a purely quantitative measure of
fairness, Johnson misses much of the discrimination against same-sex couples
embodied in the Code).
114. Charles 0. Galvin, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously-A Comment,
76 N.C. L. REV. 1749, 1749 (1998) (footnote omitted).
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II. ANTICIPATING THE INEVITABLE CRITIQUES
Being an eternal optimist (a trait that I happily share
with most tax lawyers), 15 I trust that, by now, you have
accepted my basic point that the concept of tax equity has
quietly shaped the tax policy debate through its unerring
focus on income, creating an environment that is hostile to
the contributions of critical tax scholars. Realistically,
however, I do anticipate some resistance to this rethinking
of a core concept. 11 6 In this Part, I attempt to anticipate and
counter some of those critiques.
A. A Tax on Income?
An initial reaction to my argument might be that the
income tax is, after all, a tax on "income." It is, therefore,
both necessary and appropriate to maintain a narrow focus
on taxpayers' relative incomes in determining the tax's
fairness. Correlatively, considerations of race, ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation, disability, and/or other noneconomic characteristics simply have no place in assessing
the fairness of an income tax. 11 7 The short answer to this
critique reiterates a point made in passing in the
introduction to this Article; namely, that the income tax is
115. Speaking of the tax jargon used to describe the application of § 1014 to
property acquired through inheritance, Bittker and Lokken note that, "being
perennial optimists, tax practitioners typically accentuate the positive by using
'stepped-up basis' as a generic label, whether the property has gone up or down
in value." 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24, 41.4.1.
116. The inclusion of equity among the guiding principles of tax
policymaking has been traced at least as far back as the eighteenth century. See
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF

NATIONS 777 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modern Library 1937) (1776); see also Barker,
supra note 4, at 8; Michael J. Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261,
294 (2001).
117. See, e.g., MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4, at 39 ("Some forms of
discrimination among taxpayers will count as unjust even if they do serve other
legitimate goals. The familiar suspect categories of race, sex, sexuality, and
religion come to mind."); id. at 170 ("A modern tax system cannot hope to be
neutral in its incentive effects with regard to people's economically significant
decisions about work, leisure, consumption, ownership, and form of life. If there
are requirements of neutrality, they must be rather special and related to
fundamental matters like sex, race, or religion."); Martinez, supra note 4, at 441
("There are immutable characteristics that deserve protection, for example,
differential taxation based on race would not be accepted.").
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far more than just a tax on income. As one commentator
has nicely put it, "tax policy is one of the most telling
indicators of the nation's true moral compass . . .,118
For most of their history, the individual and corporate
income taxes have been the single largest source of revenue
for the federal government. 119 Of the two, since 1944, the
individual income tax has consistently brought in more of
that revenue. 120 Indeed, since 2000, the individual income
tax has, by itself, raised between 121
43% and 49.9% of the
federal government's total revenue.
As the most important source of federal revenue, the
individual income tax is the primary and most visible
means of attempting a fair allocation of the burden 122
of
funding our government and paying for public services.
For this reason, it is generally accepted that the truly poor
should be completely exempted from tax, even if they have
"income.' ' 123 In addition, those who are perceived as
lessening the need for government action or the demand for
public services are often afforded a corresponding reduction
in their income taxes. For example, taxpayers are allowed
a deduction for contributions made to charitable
organizations. 124 As early as 1938, Congress justified this
deduction on the ground that it reduces government
spending:

118. Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on
Judeo-ChristianEthics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 747 (2006).
119. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2008: HISTORICAL

TABLES 6 (2007) (indicating that income taxes accounted for 60% of the federal
government's receipts by 1930, that this figure rose to a high of nearly 80%
during World War II, and that the figure has more recently hovered between
53% and 58%).
120. Id. at 29-30 tbl.2.1.
121. Id.

122. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4, at 3; McCaffery, supra note 11, at
830; see also Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, in BEHAVIORAL

LAW AND ECONOMICS 398, 417-19 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (discussing the
cognitive impact of the "prominence" of income taxes); Nancy C. Staudt,
Taxation Without Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555, 589 (2002) (describing the
income tax as "the most visible tax").
123. See Lipman, supra note 11, at 36, 49; Staudt, supra note 6, at 922;
Staudt, supra note 122, at 585.
124. I.R.C. § 170 (2000).
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The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to
charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds, and by125the benefits resulting
from the promotion of the general welfare.

More deliberately, the federal government has
gradually moved away from directly providing subsidized
rental housing to low-income households. 126 To fill this gap
in social services, Congress created the low-income housing
tax credit 127 to provide private developers with a financial
incentive to develop and rehabilitate affordable housing for
low-income tenants. 128 The same type of gap-filling can be
seen in the federal government's efforts to promote
retirement income security: "[T]he broad framework in the
United States for pursuing the goal of retirement income
security is a tripartite system often analogized to a threelegged stool. The three 'legs' are Social Security, private
29
employer-sponsored pension plans, and personal savings."'
Congress has included a number of provisions in the Code
that encourage individuals to save money on their own and
to encourage employers to offer-and employees to
participate in-retirement saving plans.130 By encouraging
125. H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2)
728, 742.
126. See Megan J. Ballard, Profitingfrom Poverty: The Competition Between
For-Profit and Nonprofit Developers for Low-Income Housing Tax Credits, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 211, 212 (2003).

127. I.R.C. § 42 (2000).
128. See id.
129. John K. Eason, Retirement Security Through Asset Protection: The
Evolution of Wealth, Privilege, and Policy, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 159, 176
(2004); see also id. at 177 ("Conceptually, commentators and policymakers
evaluate the attainment of this retirement income security objective by
reference to two related criteria: (1) ensuring a basic standard of living upon
retirement; and (2) facilitating some added degree of lifestyle maintenance upon
retirement."); Soc. SEC. ADMIN., YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT 1 (2007),
http://www.ssa.gov/mystatement/samplel.htm (text of sample statement sent

out to beneficiaries) ("Social Security is the largest source of income for most
elderly Americans today, but Social Security was never intended to be your only
source of income when you retire. You also will need other savings, investments,
pensions or retirement accounts to make sure you have enough money to live
comfortably when you retire.").
130. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 219, 401-420 (2000).
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private saving, Congress is able to "reduce[
public assistance and reduce[ ] pressure
Security system." 131 Even tax assistance for
of adoption 132 has been tied to the reduction
spending:

[Vol. 55
] the need for
on the Social
the promotion
of government

What does an adoption tax credit have to do with welfare
reform? Frankly, not much, Mr. President, if we are discussing our
current welfare system, but a great deal, I think, if we are
discussing a dramatically reformed system. Then we want
innovation and creativity. The current welfare system has created
a dependence on Federal programs while the envisioned system
encourages independence. Welfare spending has been growing at
an alarming pace, but so has the number of children living in
poverty, and so has the number of children who need families.
Providing a future for these children by uniting them with
loving families who can provide not only their financial welfare but
also their emotional welfare has to be a goal of this Congress. As
we move toward a system that promotes greater strength in the
American family, we ought to encourage efforts like this by using
the adoption tax credit.133

Similarly, tax relief is provided to individuals who
engage in activities that advance the national welfare and,
incidentally, reduce the need for future government
spending or the provision of public services. For example,
the web of tax deductions, credits, and tax-favored accounts
for education 134 have been justified on the ground that "our
Nation's economic success-our very future-will depend on
a highly educated and high-skilled labor force.' 35 Moreover,

131. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, PUBL'N No. JCX-16-99, OVERVIEW OF
PRESENT-LAw TAx RULES AND ISSUES RELATING TO EMPLOYER-SPONSORED

RETIREMENT PLANS 4 (1999); see also Carol Moseley-Braun, Women's Retirement
Security, 4 ELDER L.J. 493, 495 (1996) ('The widening income gap occasioned
and influenced by pension inequities shows up as an increased demand for
transfer payments and public support.").
132. See I.R.C. §§ 23, 137 (2000).
133. 142 CONG. REc. S8363 (July 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Craig).
134. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 25A, 221, 222, 529, 530 (2000).
135. 143 CONG. REc. S9715 (Sept. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. Murkowski);
see also 143 CONG. REC. S8399 (July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeffords)
("This agreement also recognizes the critical relationship between education
and our national economic well-being. In a day and age beset by downsizing,
when job skills are constantly becoming outmoded by technological advances
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"higher education results in lower unemployment, and
lessens the need for unemployment compensation and
public funding of health care." 136 Likewise, when the
deduction for personal interest was eliminated in 1986,
Congress retained the deduction for home mortgage interest
1 37
on the ground that it encourages homeownership.
Roberta Mann has summarized the benefits associated with
homeownership-including some that clearly impact future
government spending-that might have motivated Congress'
retention of this deduction:
Homeowners have been found to be more likely to vote in local
elections and work to solve local problems. This "homeowner
activism" creates a better community for all residents. Arguably,
homeowners are better citizens than renters, and thus wider home
ownership creates economic and political stability. Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") Secretary, Andrew
Cuomo, stated in a recent press release: "Home ownership has
many benefits. Homeowners generally enjoy better living
conditions than renters; accumulate wealth as their investment in
their homes grows; strengthen the economy by purchases of
homes, furniture and appliances; and tend to be more involved in
promoting strong neighborhoods and good schools than renters."
Homeowners also maintain their homes in better condition than
renters, increasing values in the neighborhood as a whole and
saving society's resources by extending the life of housing. In a
broader sense, private home ownership arguably benefits the
environment. Homeowners are likely to be more concerned than
renters about pollution and toxic waste,138and thus more likely to
take action to protect their environment.

and break-throughs in learning, education will be a lifetime endeavor. I am
happy that the bill recognizes this, and makes lifetime learning more easily
affordable."); Natasha Mulleneaux, The Failure to Provide Adequate Higher
Education Tax Incentives for Lower-Income Individuals, 14 AKRON TAX J. 27,
28-29 (1999) ("Although educational authority rests with the states, the federal
government encourages and specifically assists educational activities that are
considered in the national interest. The promotion and financial assistance of
higher education is clearly in the national interest, as higher education (1)
increases the nation's productivity and wealth, (2) assists in social progress and
(3) increases the prosperity of individuals." (footnotes omitted)).
136. Mulleneaux, supranote 135, at 30.
137. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, PUBL'N No. JCS-10-87, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 263-64 (1987).

138. Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie:The Hidden
Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1347, 1354-55
(2000) (footnotes omitted).

1226

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

These are but a small subset of the numerous
provisions in the Code that arguably have little, if anything,
to do with taxing "income." In the 1960s, Stanley Surrey
dubbed such provisions "tax expenditures."'13 9 Surrey
argued that the income tax can actually be split into two
distinct parts: (1) the structural provisions of the tax, which
"include both the normative provisions of an income tax
(i.e., items that would 'be treated in much the same way by
any group of tax experts building the structure of an income
tax') and the provisions that, even though not normative,
are necessary to build an income tax";140 and (2) the tax
preferences or penalties, which "depart from the normative
tax structure . . . [and] either . . . provid[e] governmental
assistance to taxpayers by reducing their normative tax
burden or . . . exact[ ] a penalty from taxpayers by
increasing
their normative tax burden."'14 1 Surrey
maintained that the tax preferences and penalties in the
Code are actually not tax provisions at all, but merely
disguised direct expenditure programs and penalties:
Under tax expenditure analysis, each taxpayer can be viewed as
paying to the government the tax due under the normative income
tax. Then, taxpayers who are entitled to tax preferences can be
viewed as having received a payment from the government equal
to the amount of the preference, and taxpayers who are subject to
tax penalties can be viewed as having been required to make an
additional payment to the government equal to the amount of the
penalty. In the case of tax preferences, these two payments are, in
practice, simply netted out for the sake of expediency (i.e., the tax
payment from the taxpayer is simply reduced by the amount that
the government owes the taxpayer). Thus, under tax expenditure
analysis, tax preferences and penalties are the equivalent of direct
expenditure programs and penalties, respectively. 14 2

Although tax expenditure analysis is not without its
detractors, 143 Surrey proved quite persuasive in making the
139. Infanti, supra note 17, at 717.
140. Id. at 720 (footnotes omitted) (quoting STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS
TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 17 (1973)).

141. Id. at 721.
142. Id. at 721-22 (citing STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES (1985); STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE
CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973)).

143. See id. at 736-44.
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case that bifurcating the income tax between structural
provisions and tax preferences and penalties would improve
budgetary and tax policymaking. In fact, since 1974,
Congress has mandated the preparation of a tax
144
expenditure budget as part of the annual budget process.
Yet, despite its explicit adoption of tax expenditure
analysis, Congress has not exactly rushed to eradicate tax
preferences and penalties from the Code. The Joint
Committee on Taxation's estimate of tax expenditures for
2006-2010 includes a list of tax expenditures (categorized
by subject, not Code section) that goes on for some twelve
pages. 145 And the President's fiscal year 2008 budget
proposal contains a list of no less than 161 tax expenditure
provisions. 46 In view of the dogged persistence of tax
expenditures, the argument that the income tax is no more
than a tax on "income"-and, therefore, appropriately
focuses on "income" as the sole criterion of its
"equitableness"-completely lacks the power to persuade.
B. Income as a Proxy for Discrimination
Alternatively, one might argue that income is an
appropriate criterion for measuring tax equity because
discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and
sexual orientation all appear to adversely impact wages,
which are the largest component of individual adjusted
gross income under the income tax and compose the entire
tax base for the Social Security and Medicare payroll
taxes. 47 For instance, it is well known that the earnings of
144. Id. at 718.
145. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, PUBL'N No. JCS-2-06, ESTIMATES OF

FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2006-2010, at 30-41 (2006).
146. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: FISCAL

YEAR 2008, at 287-90 (2007).
147. See I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3121(a) (2000); Brian Balkovic, Internal Revenue
Serv., Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Data, 2005, STAT. INCOME
BULL., Winter 2007, at 11, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil05inplim.pdf; Michael
Parisi & Scott Hollenbeck, Internal Revenue Serv., Individual Income Tax
Returns, 2004, STAT. INCOME BULL., Fall 2006, at 8, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi04indtr.pdf; see also Irene Browne & Joya Misra, The Intersection of Gender
and Race in the Labor Market, 29 ANN. REV. SOC. 487, 495 (2003) ("Indeed, the

gap in wages between groups is such a well-recognized summary measure of the
extent of inequality that 1970s feminist activists wore buttons that simply read
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women are only a fraction of those of men 148 and that the
earnings of African Americans and Latino/as are well below
those of whites. 149 And, contrary to the stereotype of gay
men as economically privileged, studies have repeatedly
shown that gay men actually earn lower wages than
heterosexual
men. 150 Furthermore, individuals with
'590."').
148. See RENEE E. SPRAGGINS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, WE THE PEOPLE:
WOMEN AND MEN IN THE UNITED STATES: CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS 12

(2005) ("In 1999, the median earnings of women 16 and over who worked fulltime, year-round were $27,200, about $10,000 less than the median earnings of
their male counterparts ($37,100)."); BRUCE H. WEBSTER, JR. & ALEMAYEHU
BISHAW, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, EARNINGS, AND POVERTY DATA FROM

THE 2005 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 8 (2006) (indicating that, for a period of
twelve months ending in 2005, the median earnings of women were only 76.7%
of those of men). Although the gender pay gap has narrowed substantially over
time, the pace of that narrowing slowed in the 1990s. Francine D. Blau &
Lawrence M. Kahn, The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing
Convergence, 60 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 45, 45 (2006) (pointing to census data
indicating that, from 1979 to 1989, the gender pay gap experienced a 9
percentage point narrowing, from 59.7% to 68.7%, and that, from 1989 to 1999,
the gender pay gap experienced only a 3.5 percentage point narrowing, from
68.7% to 72.2%). Some have argued that closing the wage gap may not signal
the achievement of "genuine equality for women"; specifically, McCaffery has
attempted to "show how the gender gap might narrow, without undermining...
gender injustice." MCCAFFERY, supra note 37, at 234; see also id. at 234-66
(explaining this point at length). See generally Doris Weichselbaumer & Rudolf
Winter-Ebmer, Rhetoric in Economic Research: The Case of Gender Wage
Differentials, 45 INDUS. REL. 416 (2006) (studying the use of rhetoric by
economists in explaining whether the gender wage gap is due to discrimination
or other factors).
149. See SPRAGGINS, supra note 148, at 12 fig.11 (indicating that, for 1999,
the median earnings of African American and Hispanic men ($30,000 and
$25,400, respectively) were well below those of white men ($39,235), while those
of African American and Hispanic women ($25,589 and $21,634, respectively)
were below those of white women ($27,878)); WEBSTER & BISHAW, supra note
148, at 11 tbl.5 (indicating that, for a period of twelve months ending in 2005,
the median earnings of African American and Hispanic men ($34,433 and
$27,380, respectively) were well below those of white men ($46,807), while those
of African American and Hispanic women ($29,588 and $24,451, respectively)
were well below those of white women ($34,190)).
150. E.g., Sylvia A. Allegretto & Michelle M. Arthur, An EmpiricalAnalysis
of Homosexual/Heterosexual Male Earnings Differentials: Unmarried and
Equal?, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 631, 631, 644 (2001); Nathan Berg & Donald
Lien, Measuring the Effect of Sexual Orientation on Income: Evidence of
Discrimination?,20 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 394, 411 (2002); Dan A. Black et al.,
The EarningsEffects of Sexual Orientation,56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 449, 463
(2003); John M. Blandford, The Nexus of Sexual Orientationand Gender in the
Determination of Earnings, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 622, 628 (2003);
Christopher S. Carpenter, Revisiting the Income Penalty for Behaviorally Gay
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disabilities are more likely than those without disabilities
either to be living in poverty or to be low-income. 151 So, why
complain that the use of income to gauge tax equity ignores
non-economic lines of similarity and difference if income
actually serves as a proxy for invidious discrimination along
those lines?
The problem with this argument is that income serves,
at best, as a partial and incomplete proxy for discrimination
and, at worst, as a highly misleading one. Mention of Asian
Americans was noticeably absent from the examples in the
previous paragraph of earnings gaps that are attributed to
the effects of discrimination. Although the earnings of
African Americans and Latino/as are lower than those of
whites, the earnings of Asian Americans exceed those of
whites. 15 2 Looked at in isolation, these income statistics
might (incorrectly) lead one to believe that Asian Americans
suffer no discrimination at all in the United States;
however, Mylinh Uy has explained the multitude of reasons
why income statistics paint a picture of Asian American

Men: Evidence from NHANES III, 14 LAB. ECON. 25, 29-32 (2007); see also M.V.
LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF LESBIANS

AND GAY MEN 20-51 (2001) (Badgett's method of identifying lesbians and gay
men in her study has been critiqued by both Black et al., supra, at 453-56, and
Blandford, supra, at 625-26; this study was originally published as M.V. Lee
Badgett, The Wage Effects of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 48 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 726 (1995)).
151. See ERIKA

STEINMETZ, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICANS WITH

DISABILITIES: 2002, at 8-9 (2006) (all figures relate to individuals age 25-64).
With regard to the lower-income range, 39.3% of those without disabilities
reported income less than $20,000 and 12.3% of them lived in a household with
total household income below $20,000. Id. In comparison, 47.6% of those with a
non-severe disability had income less than $20,000 and 18.3% of them lived in a
household with total household income below $20,000, while 76.6% percent of
those with a severe disability had income below $20,000 and 37.8% of them
lived in a household with total household income below $20,000. Id. at 9. Fully
one quarter (25.9%) of those with a severe disability were living in poverty,
while 11.2% of those with a non-severe disability and only 7.7% of those without
a disability were living in poverty. Id.
152. SPRAGGINS, supra note 148, at 12 fig.11 (indicating that, for 1999, the
earnings of Asian American men were $40,650 and those of white men were
$39,235, while the earnings of Asian American women were $31,049 and those
of white women were $27,878); WEBSTER & BISHAW, supra note 148, at 11 tbl.5
(indicating that, for a period of twelve months ending in 2005, the earnings of
Asian American men were $48,693 and those of white men were $46,807, while
the earnings of Asian American women were $37,792 and those of white women
were $34,190).
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experience that is both coarse and misleading. 153
Despite the inclusion of individuals with disabilities in
the list of examples of earnings gaps above, there is some
question about whether income actually serves as an
accurate proxy for disability discrimination. In 1990,
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) to redress discrimination (including employment
discrimination) against individuals with disabilities 1in
54
order to help them to achieve economic self-sufficiency.
Whether the ADA has had a positive or negative effect on
the economic circumstances of individuals with disabilities
has been the subject of serious scholarly debate. For
example, based on economic modeling, one scholar predicted
that the ADA's requirement that covered employers make
"reasonable accommodations" for disabled employees would
"increase or leave unchanged the relative wages of disabled
workers while decreasing their relative employment
levels. 1 55 Two empirical studies of wage and employment
rates of individuals with disabilities before and after the
ADA's enactment appear to bear out this prediction that the
ADA may actually have worsened-and not amelioratedwith
circumstances
of
individuals
the
economic
disabilities. 156 However, other studies contradict these
findings by suggesting that "those likely to be considered
disabled under the ADA . . . improved their relative
employment levels in the early 1990s."'157 The conflicting
results of these studies-as well as shortcomings in their
153. Mylinh Uy, Note, Tax and Race: The Impact on Asian Americans, 11
ASIAN L.J. 117, 129-36 (2004).
154. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(6),
(a)(8), (b)(2), 104 Stat. 327, 328-29 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101) (indicating
that "census data, national polls, and other studies have documented that
people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our society, and
socially, vocationally, economically, and
are severely disadvantaged
educationally"; setting forth "equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" as proper national goals for
individuals with disabilities; and further stating that one of the purposes of the
ADA is "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities").
155. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 275
(2000).
156. See id. at 276-78.

157. Peter Blanck et al., Calibratingthe Impact of the ADA's Employment
Provisions, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 268 (2003).
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design-have led some commentators to conclude that the
research on the ADA's "impact on the employment
prospects and economic independence of individuals with
disabilities" is "inconclusive."' 158
Even setting aside the possibility that the federal
government's own efforts to curb disability discrimination
may have actually harmed individuals with disabilitiesand, for our purposes, may therefore have limited the
viability of using income as a proxy for disability
discrimination-the income tax may do a less than adequate
job of taking disability into account in arriving at an
appropriate net "income" on which tax should be levied. It
has been argued that the additional standard deduction for
the blind 159 singles them out for special treatment and
discriminates against individuals with other forms of
disability. 160 Moreover, even for the blind, this additional
standard deduction may overstate the extra costs of living
with a disability, duplicate the deduction for medical
expenses, or "make[ ] it less likely that a blind person will
be able to deduct medical expenses or any employmentrelated expenses."'161 Although many of the additional costs
of living with a disability are now deductible as medical
expenses or employment-related expenses (exempted from
the 2% floor for miscellaneous itemized deductions), 162 no
deduction is currently allowed for any additional costs
incurred by disabled individuals in commuting to and from
work. 163 In addition, the exemption of "impairment-related
work expenses" from the application of the 2% floor for
miscellaneous itemized deductions has been described as
having only modest practical effects 64 because those
158. Id.; see also Jolls, supra note 155, at 278-80 (acknowledging the
shortcomings of the studies upon which she relies). See generally Robert
Silverstein et al., What Policymakers Need and Must Demand from Research
Regarding the Employment Rate of Persons with Disabilities, 23 BEHAV. SC. &

L. 399 (2005) (describing the difficulties and challenges associated with
researching the employment rate of individuals with disabilities).
159. I.R.C. § 63(f) (2000).
160. See Seto & Buhai, supra note 31, at 1123-24.
161. Id. at 1123; see also id. at 1124, 1141.
162. I.R.C. § 67(b)(6), (d) (2000).
163. See Seto & Buhai, supranote 31, at 1131, 1134-35.
164. See id. at 1129. I would note that this statement was made in reliance,
in part, on the non-deductibility of impairment-related work expenses for
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expenses are still treated as itemized deductions (i.e., they
are only allowed in lieu of the standard deduction and not
in addition to it, as are most other expenses incurred to
produce income). 165 It might further be argued that the
7.5% floor on medical expenses, which is meant to screen
out all but extraordinary medical expenses, 166 is
inappropriately applied to the extra costs of daily living
incurred by individuals with disabilities. 167 In these ways,
the income of individuals with disabilities may either be
overstated or understated, resulting in a mismeasurement
of the effects of discrimination on income and undermining
the viability of using income as a proxy for disability
discrimination.
Income also may paint an incomplete picture of the
societal discrimination faced by those who experience
discrimination along multiple axes (e.g., women of color).
Kimberle Crenshaw has analogized the experience of such
multiple disadvantages to a traffic intersection:
Consider an analogy to traffic in an intersection, coming and going
in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic through an
intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow in another.
If an accident happens in an intersection, it can be caused by cars
traveling from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all
of them. 168

Crenshaw has remarked that the experience of being
multiply disadvantaged can be greater than the sum of the
separate disadvantages; thus, for example, African
alternative minimum tax (AMT) purposes; however, this assertion appears to be
incorrect. While miscellaneous itemized deductions are disallowed under the
AMT, see I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000), impairment-related work expenses are
expressly carved out from the definition of miscellaneous itemized deductions,
see id. § 67(b), and I have come across no other provision that disallows these
expenses for AMT purposes.
165. See I.R.C. § 62 (2000) (listing "above-the-line" deductions that are
allowed in addition to any standard deduction to which a taxpayer is entitled
under § 63).
166. See Seto & Buhai, supra note 31, at 1104.
167. See id. at 1143 (referring to an argument made by David Duff in
response to a draft of the article, but expressing their disagreement with this
argument).
168. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 149.
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American women's experience of subordination cannot be
summed up by merely adding together racism and
sexism. 169 Crenshaw makes the point quite forcefully and
eloquently in the following passage:
Black women can experience discrimination in ways that are both
similar to and different from those experienced by white women
and Black men. Black women sometimes experience discrimination
in ways similar to white women's experiences; sometimes they
share very similar experiences with Black men. Yet often they
experience
double- discrimination-the
combined effects of
practices which discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis
of sex. And sometimes, they experience discrimination as Black
women-not the sum of race and sex discrimination, but as Black
women. 170

Whether income accurately reflects such unique,
intersectional experiences of discrimination is not at all
clear. For example, sociological studies of wage inequality
that probe the impact of intersecting race and gender have
produced mixed results. 171 As a review of that literature
notes: "Overall, studies of wage determination at the
individual level echo . . . findings that there are some
distinct patterns for women of color, but also similarities to
coethnic men (the race stratification system) and to White
women (the gender stratification system)." 172 However, at
169. Id. at 140; see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43

STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1991) (building on these observations "by exploring
the various ways in which race and gender intersect in shaping structural,
political, and representational aspects of violence against women of color"). This
perspective is shared by others. See, e.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece:
Perspectiveson the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 371-72;
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 701, 704-10, 714-28 (2001); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 587-89 (1990);
"Intersectionality,"
Crisis:
Identity
Hutchinson,
Lenard
Darren
"Multidimensionality," and the Development of an Adequate Theory of
Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 307-16 (2001); see also Browne &
Misra, supra note 147, at 488 (indicating that others share this perspective);
Mary Jo Wiggins, Foreword: The Future of Intersectionality and Critical Race
Feminism, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 677, 677-78 (2001) (same).
170. Crenshaw, supra note 168, at 149.
171. See Browne & Misra, supra note 147, at 496.
172. Id. at 497; see, e.g., Irene Browne & Rachel Askew, Race, Ethnicity, and
Wage Inequality Among Women: What Happened in the 1990s and Early 21st
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least one study cited in the review indicates that race and
gender are "independent and additive."'173 The study
"report[ed] that evidence for intersectionality appears
negligible, concluding that race and gender represent two
independent systems of inequality."'174 The authors of the
Century?, 48 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1275 (2005); Leslie McCall, Sources of

Racial Wage Inequality in Metropolitan Labor Markets: Racial, Ethnic, and
Gender Differences, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 520 (2001); Rosalie A. Torres Stone et al.,
Beyond Asian American: Examining Conditions and Mechanisms of Earnings
Inequality for Filipina and Asian Indian Women, 49 Soc. PERSP. 261 (2006);
Rosalie Torres Stone & Julia McQuillan, Beyond Hispanic/Latino: The
Importance of Gender/Ethnicity-Specific Earnings Analyses, 36 Soc. Sci. RES.
175 (2007).
173. David A. Cotter et al., Systems of Gender, Race, and Class Inequality:
Multilevel Analyses, 78 Soc. FORCES 433, 453 (1999); see also Browne & Misra,
supra note 147, at 496, 498.
In their book on social dominance, Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto put forth
the "subordinate-male target hypothesis" that arbitrary-set discrimination (i.e.,
a residual category that includes any discrimination other than on the basis of
age or gender) will disproportionately impact males in the arbitrary-set group.
JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRArrO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF
SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 49-50 (1999). This hypothesis, which they
support with survey data from a number of different areas (e.g., housing

discrimination, id. at 144-45, discrimination in the retail market, id. at 147,
employment discrimination, id. at 157-62, and discrimination in education, id.
at 189-91), is "in direct contradiction to the generally accepted double-jeopardy
hypothesis" of the literature on intersectionality. Id. at 50. For instance, the
subordinate-male target hypothesis would, all other things being equal, predict
that African American males would suffer more as a result of discrimination
than African American females, even though African American males
experience subordination along only one axis (i.e., race) and African American
females experience subordination along two axes (i.e., race and gender). See id.
Based on their review of empirical data, Sidanius and Pratto maintain that,
"[t]hough women from subordinate arbitrary-set groups clearly suffer from
gender discriminationalong with women from dominant arbitrary-set groups,
the arbitrary-set discrimination against these subordinate women is either
relatively mild or nonexistent." Id. at 295. To explain the subordinate-male
target hypothesis, Sidanius and Pratto draw on evolutionary psychology and
rely upon the idea that men and women engage in different reproductive
strategies (i.e., women seek out high status mates while men attempt to
monopolize social, political, and economic resources to increase their chances of
reproductive success given women's status preference). See id. at 263-65,
295-96. Unsurprisingly, Sidanius and Pratto's work has provoked criticism. See,
e.g., Browne & Misra, supra note 147, at 493-94; Michael T. Schmitt & Nyla R.
Branscombe, Will the Real Social Dominance Theory Please Stand Up?, 42 BRIT.
J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 215 (2003); John C. Turner & Katherine J. Reynolds, Why
Social Dominance Theory Has Been Falsified, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 199
(2003).
174. Browne & Misra, supra note 147, at 496; see also Cotter et al., supra
note 173.
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study suggest that their findings provide support for
arguments "about the potential salience of one dimension of
stratification over another." 175 Interestingly, based on the
results of their research, the authors of the study pointedly
raised "the question of why racial and gender economic
inequality are uncorrelated when racial and gender
prejudice are so closely related."'176
Faced with conflicting studies, the authors of the
literature review concluded that, "although much evidence
indicates that there is some amount of race/gender
intersections in wage inequality, the existence and degree
of intersections depends on how wages are measured, which
groups are compared, and how the relationships are
modeled." 177 In order "[t]o arbitrate between these mixed
findings,"' 7 8 the authors of the literature review asserted
that "better theories are needed that identify the conditions
under which race and gender will intersect to produce wage
inequities."'1 79 Underscoring this point-and concomitantly
highlighting the inappropriateness of relying upon income
as a proxy for the general discrimination suffered by
multiply disadvantaged persons-the authors of the
literature review remarked on the distinct gap between the
ability to articulate how intersectionality affects the social
construction of gender and race and the ability to articulate
how intersectionality affects wages:
The literature on wage inequality in particular shows the gaps
in the literature. Theories of intersectionality are less developed in
articulating how intersections of gender and race are implicated in
the intricate workings of the economy at the macro level than they
0
are about the social construction of gender and race.1 8

175. Cotter et al., supra note 173, at 446. This appears to be a reference to
the elision of gender in efforts to address racial subordination and the elision of
race in efforts to address women's subordination. See Deborah K. King, Multiple
Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14
SIGNS 42 (1988) (cited by Cotter et al., supra, as an example of such an

argument about salience).
176. Cotter et al., supra note 173, at 454.
177. Browne & Misra, supra note 147, at 498.
178. Id.
179. Id.

180. Id. at 495. The economics literature appears to be even less advanced
in terms of addressing the intersection of multiple lines of disadvantage:
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These doubts about the propriety of using income as a
proxy for intersectional discrimination are confirmed with
respect to a different point of intersection; that is, the
intersection of gender and sexual orientation. Though gay
men earn less than heterosexual men, studies have shown
that lesbians and bisexual women earn more than
heterosexual women (i.e., they experience what has been
termed a "wage premium").181 This result is counterintuitive
because one would expect lesbians and bisexual women to
do worse in the labor market than heterosexual womennot better-due to the additional disadvantage of their
sexual orientation. Yet, it may be that any negative effects
on wages caused by lesbians' and bisexual women's gender
and sexual orientation are more than counterbalanced by
positive effects due to their (actual or imagined) departure
from stereotypical gender roles-particularly with regard to
marriage and child-rearing, which are often perceived to
reduce a woman's commitment to market labor.18 2 In other
words, several negatives (i.e., gender and sexual orientation
discrimination plus what looks like a bonus for departing
from gender stereotypes but that is, in reality, just more
gender discrimination) seem to come together to produce a
positive (i.e., a wage premium). This positive outcome, in
the form of a wage premium, sends the (erroneous) message
that lesbians and bisexual women are treated better by
society than heterosexual women. Accordingly, income
With a few recent exceptions, economists who study the status of
women of color in the United States have not addressed the
intersectionality of gender, race, and class. Studies of the determinants
of earnings tend to focus either on racial differences or on gender
differences, but rarely on both. To study the effects of race, a
researcher compares the wages of black men to those of white men and
the wages of black women to those of white women. To study the effects
of gender, a researcher compares the wages of black women to those of
black men and the wages of white women to those of white men. The
combined effects of race and gender are rarely contemplated in the
same paper.
Rose M. Brewer et al., The Complexities and Potential of Theorizing Gender,
Caste, Race, and Class, 8 FEMINIST ECON. 3, 7 (2002).

181. E.g., Black et al., supra note 150, at 466; Blandford, supra note 150, at
638-39; see also Letitia Anne Peplau & Adam Fingerhut, The Paradox of the
Lesbian Worker, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 719, 720-21 (2004) (mentioning a number of

studies).
182. See Black et al., supra note 150, at 466-69; Blandford, supra note 150,
at 639-40; Peplau & Fingerhut, supra note 181, at 721-27.
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paints a misleading picture of the discrimination faced by
lesbians and bisexual women.
Moreover, income generally fails to capture the
psychological dimension of discrimination. Psychologists
have recently begun to turn their attention to studying the
mental health effects of discrimination. A recent review of
138 separate studies concerning either the psychological or
physical health effects of self-reported experiences of racism
found that "[t]he most consistent association between selfreported racism and health was found for negative mental
health outcomes, for which 72% of examined outcomes were
significantly associated with self-reported racism, all in the
expected direction (i.e. more self-reported racism associated
with worse mental health outcomes).' 1 83 Among the
negative mental health effects reported by these studies
were emotional distress, depression, obsessive-compulsive
symptoms, anxiety, stress, and somatization (i.e., the
conversion of anxiety into physical symptoms). 184 Similarly,
researchers have detected such "minority" stress and its
concomitant negative mental health effects among lesbians,
gay men, and bisexuals. 185 Ilan Meyer of Columbia
University's Mailman School of Public Health has even
''proposed a minority stress model that explains the higher
prevalence of mental disorders [among lesbians, gay men,

183. Yin Paradies, A Systematic Review of Empirical Research on SelfReported Racism and Health, 35 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 888, 892 (2006); see also
id. at 895 ("The most consistent findings in this body of research to date have
been for negative mental health outcomes and health-related behaviours and
evidence from longitudinal studies also suggests that self-reported racism
precedes ill health rather than vice versa.").
184. Id. at 892 tbl.2.
185. See, e.g., Robin J. Lewis et al., Stressors for Gay Men and Lesbians: Life
Stress, Gay-Related Stress, Stigma Consciousness,and Depressive Symptoms, 22
J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 716, 717-18, 725-26 (2003); Ilan H. Meyer,
Minority Stress and Mental Health in Gay Men, 36 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAv. 38,
45-52 (1995); Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress, and Mental Health in
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: Conceptual Issues and Research
Evidence, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 674, 679-82 (2003) [hereinafter Meyer,

Prejudice]; Ilan H. Meyer & Laura Dean, Internalized Homophobia, Intimacy,
and Sexual Behavior Among Gay and Bisexual Men, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL
ORIENTATION: UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND
BISEXUALS 160, 178-83 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998). See generally Joanne

DiPlacido, Minority Stress Among Lesbians, Gay Men, and Bisexuals: A
Consequence of Heterosexism, Homophobia, and Stigmatization, in STIGMA AND
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, supra, at 185.
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and bisexuals] as caused by excess in social stressors
related to stigma and prejudice."'18 6 Yet, as a natural
corollary of its inability to account for "psychic" income, the
income tax does not allow for any sort of a "psychic"
deduction to account for the negative mental health effects
of discrimination. 8 7 As might by now be expected, these
effects enter into the calculation of income only if they have
economic consequences (that is, 88
if they result in out-ofpocket expenses for medical care).'
Compounding its failure to account for the negative
health effects of discrimination, the income tax can, in fact,
exacerbate those effects. As I have explained in detail in an
earlier article, 8 9 the application of the income tax (and the
gift tax) to same-sex couples is woefully uncertain in
important areas. When coupled with the steep civil and
criminal penalties that can be imposed on same-sex couples
for failing to comply with the tax laws, this uncertainty
'hang[s] as an ominous Sword of Damocles over the heads
of lesbians and gay men throughout the country." ' 190 The
hovering possibility of punishment under the tax laws for
being in a same-sex relationship-along with the (explicit
and implicit) stigmatizing effects of the application of the
Defense of Marriage Act' 9 ' through the Code-surely adds
to the "excess stress to which [lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals] are exposed as a result of their . . . minority[ ]
186. Meyer, Prejudice,supra note 185, at 691.
187. See Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost too Much: Zarin v.
Commissioner and the Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAX L. REV.
215, 224 (1990) ("[T]axable consumption commonly is viewed as limited to
satisfactions from the use of economic resources . . . not, say, to seeing a
beautiful sunset or making a new friend. The chief reason for this limitation is
administrative: Nonmaterial psychic income may be impossible to measure."
(footnotes omitted)).
188. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (2000) (flush language) (the § 104(a)(2) exclusion for
damages received on account of "physical" injury or sickness does not apply to
emotional distress except to the extent of amounts paid for medical care); id. §
213 (allowing a deduction for extraordinary medical expenses).
189. Infanti, supra note 113, at 783-88.
190. Id. at 801 (quoting Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the Police
Are in Our Bedrooms, Shouldn't the Courts Go in After Them?: An Update on
the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997, 997 (1994)).
191. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (defining "marriage," for purposes of all federal
laws-including the Code-as "a legal union between one man and one woman
as husband and wife").
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position."19 2
For all of these reasons, ignoring race, ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation, disability, and/or other
characteristics in tax policy analysis cannot be justified on
the ground that "income" serves as a proxy193for invidious
discrimination based on those characteristics.
C. The Perfect Is the Enemy of the Good
As income appears to be an indisputably imperfect
proxy for discrimination, the next most natural argument
in favor of the status quo is a resort to the old saw that "the
perfect is the enemy of the good." This is essentially a
restatement of Galvin's contribution to the North Carolina
Law Review symposium on critical tax theory in which he
asserted that it is just too difficult to take race or gender
(not to mention other bases for invidious discrimination)
into consideration when formulating tax policy.1 94 Instead,
Galvin argued, we should focus our efforts on attaining the
"neutral" goal of implementing a comprehensive income (or
alternatively, a pure consumed income) tax base, because
"[1]ower-income, middle-income, or higher-income AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, or other
groups all struggle with the human predicament. To try to
solve particular problems through the Internal Revenue
Code would present a daunting challenge no lawmaker
should or could take on." 195 Frankly, I find this argument
particularly unconvincing.
Commentators often speak of the need to simplify the
192. Meyer, Prejudice, supra note 185, at 675; see also Infanti, supra note
113, at 800-03 (explaining how the Code operates in much the same way as a
sodomy statute).
193. It is worth noting that income is not just a poor proxy for
discrimination. Those who believe that "[r]edistribution in favor of those with
bad brute luck is attractive on both utilitarian and liberal egalitarian grounds"
have similarly found income to come up short in its ability to serve as a proxyin that case, for endowment. Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 DUKE
L.J. 1145, 1181 (2006). See generally id. (surveying the endowment tax
literature). And, tying into the next section in the text, Zelenak even critiques
the idea that the income tax, by itself, is simply the best that can be done in
approaching an endowment tax base. See id. My thanks go to Adam Rosenzweig
for pointing me in the direction of this literature.
194. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 114, at 1752.
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tax system; however, when faced with a choice between
simple rules, on the one hand, and efficient or equitable
rules, on the other, the efficient or equitable rules usually
win out.1 9 6 As Michael Graetz has remarked, "simplicity
always seems to be the forgotten stepchild of income tax
policy. Routinely lip service is offered to the idea that the
tax law ought to be as simple to comply with and administer
as possible; then, after a nod and a wink, vaulting complexity
overleaps itself."197 It seems suspicious that this "forgotten
stepchild" is suddenly remembered and trotted out as soon
as the conversation turns to questions of race, ethnicity,
gender, sexual orientation, disability, and/or other
characteristics that form the basis for invidious
discrimination. Why is additional complexity not an
acceptable price to pay for enhancing the fairness of the
income tax along these lines?
It also seems disingenuous to argue that taking these
concerns into account is just too difficult, when we tolerate
mind-numbing levels of complexity in areas that benefit the
wealthy. In this regard, the preferential tax rates
applicable to capital gains immediately spring to mind. 198
Were we to tax capital gains at the same rates as ordinary
income, we would no longer need, among other Code
provisions and 199
sundry rules: (1) our ambiguous definition of
"capital asset"' and the reams of case law interpreting

196. Simplicity, on the other hand, is not inherently good ....[S]imple
tax laws may be good or bad, depending upon their effect on equity on
[sic] efficiency. To the extent simple tax laws enhance equality and
efficiency they are good. They are not good strictly because they are
simple-they are good because they promote the other, more important
objectives. No one would argue that equity is good because it is simple;
nor would anyone contend that efficiency is good because it promotes
simplicity. Simplicity, therefore, is a means and not an end. If
simplicity were more often than not a helpful means to the ends of
equity and efficiency, one could at least argue that simplicity was
generally a good thing. Again, however, the propensity for simplicity to
do just as much damage to these core values, as much as it might help
them, cuts against this argument.
Donaldson, supra note 26, at 740.
197. Graetz, supra note 116, at 310.
198. See 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24,
46.1, at 46-6 ("The capital
gain and loss provisions are a leading source of complexity in the tax law .....
199. I.R.C. § 1221 (2000).
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(2) the case law interpreting the distinction between a
"sale or other disposition" (which triggers realization of gain
or loss under § 1001) and a "sale or exchange" (the narrower
category of dispositions that qualify for capital gain or loss
treatment) and the attendant legislative fixes; 201 (3) the §
1231 hotchpot; 20 2 (4) depreciation recapture; 20 3 (5) § 1(h),
which contains slightly fewer different tax rates (i.e., 5%,
15%, 25%, and 28%) than the ordinary income rate schedule
(i.e., 10%, 15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%), but that is far
harder to apply in practice; 20 4 (6) the capital loss
limitations; 20 5 and (7) the capital loss carryover rules. 20 6
The tax "preference" that gives rise to all of this complexity
is afforded on grounds that can best be described as
contestable; 20 7 yet,
the benefits are reaped overwhelmingly
208
by the wealthy.
it;200

200. See 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 24,
201. See id.

47.1-.9.

48.1-.4.

§ 1231 (2000).
§§ 1245, 1250.

202. See I.R.C.
203. See id.
204. Id.

§ 1(h); Rev. Proc. 2006-53, § 3.01, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996; see also

INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, 2006 1040 INSTRUCTIONS, at

D-1 to D-10 (2006) (providing instructions on reporting and calculating the tax
on capital gains); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, SCHEDULE

D (FORM 1040) (2006) (form for reporting and calculating the tax on capital
gains).
205. See I.R.C.
206. See id.

§ 1211 (2000).

§ 1212.

207. See ANDREWS, supra note 3, at 1043-46; Donaldson, supra note 26, at
714 n.325. Compare STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, supra note 145, at 34 tbl.1
(classifying the preferential capital gain rates as a tax expenditure), with
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 146, at 299, 305 (indicating that the
preferential rate for capital gains recognized on the sale or exchange of
corporate stock has not been treated as a tax expenditure under the "reference
law baseline" since 2005), id. at 317 (indicating that the preferential rate for
capital gains is not reported as a tax expenditure when a consumption tax is
used as the baseline), and id. at 321 (reporting capital gains recognized on the
sale or exchange of corporate stock as a "negative" tax expenditure-i.e., as an
overpayment of tax to the federal government).
208. A major complaint made by some about lower gains rates cut is
that they primarily benefit very high income individuals. Capital gains
are concentrated among higher income individuals because these
individuals tend to own capital and because they are likely to own
capital that generates capital gains. For example, the Joint Committee
on Taxation indicated that for 2005, 88% of the benefit of lower rates
[sic] to individuals with incomes over $200,000 and 95% would go to
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Moreover, the paean to simplification seems premature.
As I have explained elsewhere, the critical tax movement is
still in its early stages. 209 How can one possibly conclude
that the benefits of critical analysis are dwarfed by the
complexity they would introduce into the Code when critical
tax theorists have produced only a relative handful of
contributions to the tax policy literature? To condemn an
entire area of inquiry based on initial forays seems hasty (if
not hostile and reactionary). The more prudent course is to
wait for critical tax theorists to produce policy analyses and
to judge them on their individual merits as they appearrather than before they are ever written.
III. THE HEGEMONIC QUALITY OF TAX EQUITY
Thus far, we have explored tax equity from a critical
perspective. We first considered the subtle ways in which
tax equity, subsumed by the overarching goal of efficiency,
shapes the tax policy debate. We witnessed how the concept
of tax equity, as currently constructed, is based on the
assumption of an artificially homogeneous population; how
it effectively screens some critical contributions out of the
tax policy debate; and how it sanitizes any remaining
critical contributions to that debate by forcing them to be
framed in "neutral" terms. We then considered arguments
in favor of retaining the tax equity status quo, and
discussed the reasons why those arguments come up short.
In this Part, I would like to shift from a critical to a
dominant group perspective and explore why, from that
perspective, constructing a concept of tax equity that so
narrowly focuses on the economic dimension of people is
such a powerful rhetorical move.
individuals with incomes over $100,000. Individuals with $200,000 of
income account for about 3% of taxpayers and individuals with incomes
over $100,000 account for less [sic] about 14%.
JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., REP. No. 96-769,
CAPITAL GAINS TAXES: AN OVERVIEW, at CRS-6 (2007), available at
http://www.opencrs.com/getfile.php?rid=56609; see also CITIZENS FOR TAX
1
(2006),
PAYS
CAPITAL
GAINS
TAXES?
JUSTICE,
WHO

http://www.ctj.org/pdf/cg0306.pdf (indicating that, in 2005, "[t]he wealthiest 10
percent of taxpayers enjoyed 90 percent of the capital gains eligible" for
preferential rates, while "[t]he poorest sixty percent of Americans, by contrast,
collectively received just 2 percent of the capital gains eligible for the lower
capital gains rates").
209. Infanti, supra note 17, at 712-13.
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A. The Gramscian Concept of Hegemony
To help us understand the power of this rhetorical
move, I would like to begin by briefly introducing the
concept of "hegemony" as developed by Antonio Gramsci.
Gramsci was an Italian communist who was imprisoned by
Mussolini from 1926-1937 and died within days of his
release. 210 During his decade-long imprisonment, Gramsci
"produced the hugely influential series of essays
posthumously assembled as the Prison Notebooks,"211 21in2
which he explicated his conceptualization of hegemony.
The importance of this concept to the instant project is
evinced by Douglas Litowitz's observation that "Gramsci's
work on hegemony provides a useful starting point for legal
that domination is often subtle,
scholars who understand' '213
invisible, and consensual.
Gramsci posited that a social group maintains its
21 4
supremacy through a combination of force and consent.
In Gramsci's own words:

210. See Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith, General Introduction to
SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI, at xvii,

xvii-xviii, xciii-xciv (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. & trans.,
1971) [hereinafter PRISON NOTEBOOKS].
211. Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci,Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV.
515, 518; see also id. at 515 (describing Gramsci's concept of "hegemony" as a
"central theme during the heyday of the Critical Legal Studies movement");
CARL BOGGS, GRAMSCI'S MARXISM 7 (1976) (describing the rising influence of
Gramsci's thought in Western Europe and the United States during the 1960s
and 1970s); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA
F. 32, 32 (1982) (stating that Gramsci's concept of hegemony made "him a
crucial figure in 20th century Marxist theory").
212. Recourse to this concept is particularly appropriate in the context of
the current project because, through his development of the concept of
hegemony, Gramsci is credited with abandoning economic determinism (i.e., the
view that the superstructure-that is, law, politics, and ideology-is merely a
reflection of the base-that is, the economic structure of society) in favor of a
more complex and dynamic view of the interaction between base and
superstructure. See BOGGS, supra note 211, at 36-38; IVES, supra note 2, at 3;
Litowitz, supra note 211, at 527-29; see also PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210,
at 366, 377, 407-09.
213. Litowitz, supra note 211, at 519.
214. PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 12; see also Edward Greer,
Antonio Gramsci and "Legal Hegemony," in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 304, 305 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Litowitz, supra note
211, at 518.
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[The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as
"domination" and as "intellectual and moral leadership". A social
group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to "liquidate",
or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and
allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already
exercise "leadership" before winning governmental power (this
indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of such
power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises
power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to
2 15
"lead" as well.

Here, "domination" is associated with "[t]he apparatus
of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on
those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or
passively. '216 Examples of such legal force include "coercive
state action by the courts, the police, the army, and the
national guard. ' 217 Naturally, "domination" also entails the
threat of future force in the event that those who currently
consent to their own subordination later change their
minds. 218
But domination alone is insufficient to maintain lasting
control over subordinated groups. 219 The dominant group
must also exercise "leadership," what Gramsci often labeled
"hegemony. ' 220 The "leadership" (or "hegemony") that
Gramsci speaks of is a leadership of ideas. Gramsci
observed that, through a dominant group's exercise of
ideological leadership, it could actually secure the consent
of other groups to their own subordination. Thus, Gramsci
described "hegemony" as
[t]he "spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the
dominant fundamental group; this consent is "historically" caused
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of

215. PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 57-58.
216. Id. at 12.
217. Litowitz, supra note 211, at 519.
218. See PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 12.

219. See id. at 59, 310; Litowitz, supra note 211, at 518-19.
220. See Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Preface to PRISON
NOTEBOOKS,

supra note 210, at ix, xiii-xiv.

TAX EQUIV

2008]
production.

1245

221

As this passage suggests, this consent is not
"spontaneous" in the usual sense of the word. Despite
feeling uncoerced, subordinated groups' consent is actually
shaped and influenced by past history, including past
exercises of "leadership," which those groups have
internalized to the point where it has simply come to feel
normal and natural. 222 The dominant group secures this
"'spontaneous" consent by offering a conception of life or
world-view that serves its own interests, but that, at the
same time, is connected with "common sense" (i.e., that taps
into this internalized past history) in a way that makes it
appealing to both intellectuals and the masses. 223 "Common
sense" here takes on a special meaning that provides a
useful link to this idea that 'pure' spontaneity does not
exist in history";224 for Gramsci, "common sense" (as
distinguished from "good sense") means "the uncritical and
largely unconscious way of perceiving and understanding
225
the world that has become 'common' in any given epoch."
Of course, the dominant group must make some
sacrifices to subordinated groups in fashioning this worldview in order to align their interests and make the
subordinated groups' consent feasible; however, those
sacrifices occur only at the margins and never jeopardize
the dominant group's control. 226 With some effort, the
dominant group's world-view (as tempered to appeal to
subordinated groups) can eventually transform the "popular
'mentality"' and come to be "concretely-i.e. historically and
socially-universal. ' 227 Once a world-view achieves such
mass acceptance, it comes to seem natural or normal, and it
becomes "implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic
activity and in all manifestations of individual and

221. PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supranote 210, at 12.

222. See id. at 196-200; IVES, supra note 2, at 96-98; see also infra note 228
and accompanying text.
223. See PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 328-29, 341, 421-22.
224. Id. at 196.
225. Id. at 322.
226. See id. at 161; see also Greer, supra note 214, at 305-06.
227. PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supranote 210, at 348.
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[This] type of control . . . is more insidious and complicated to
achieve. It involves subduing and co-opting dissenting voices
through subtle dissemination of the dominant group's perspective
as universal and natural, to the point where the dominant beliefs
and practices become an intractable component of common sense.
In a hegemonic regime, an unjust social arrangement is
internalized and endlessly reinforced in schools, churches,
institutions,
scholarly exchanges, museums, and popular
22 9
culture.

As this passage implies, the actual work of obtaining
the consent of subordinated groups is performed by the
"intellectuals," a group that Gramsci broadly construed to
encompass all those who "are the dominant group's
'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social
hegemony and political government. ' 230 Gramsci did stress,
however, the importance to any social group seeking
domination of ideologically conquering and assimilating the
"traditional intellectuals" (e.g., "the man of letters, the
philosopher, the artist"231), because they play an important
role in packaging and diffusing the dominant group's
ideas. 232
Importantly, Gramsci viewed the exercise of hegemony
as a dynamic process rather than a static condition: "The
reality of any hegemony, in the extended political and
cultural sense, is that, while by definition, it is always
dominant, it is never either total or exclusive. 233
Consequently, we should expect "forms of alternative or
directly oppositional politics and culture [to] exist as

228. Id. at 328; see also id. at 103-04, 325, 327.
229. Litowitz, supra note 211, at 519.
230. PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 12; see id. ("This way of posing
the problem has as a result a considerable extension of the concept of
intellectual, but it is the only way which enables one to reach a concrete
approximation of reality.").
231. Id. at 9.
232. See id. at 10, 338-39, 341, 390, 395-96, 419-20; IVES, supra note 2, at
72-77.
233. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, MARXISM AND LITERATURE 113 (1977); see also

BOGGS, supra note 211, at 40.
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significant elements in the society, ' 234 with some of these
alternative or oppositional ideas having been shaped
against the backdrop of the specific hegemony and others
having grown up independent of it.235 In other words, it is
both possible and necessary to chip away at and undermine
the ideological hegemony of the dominant group and to offer
what some commentators have labeled a "counterhegemony" (i.e., leadership in an alternative direction)
before the dominant group's hold can be broken and its
control replaced with that of another group. 236 Nevertheless,
we should concomitantly expect the hegemonic process to
attempt to exercise control over these alternative or
neutralizing, reducing, or
oppositional ideas, whether by
237
itself.
into
them
incorporating
Because the concept of hegemony was not the exclusive
subject of a single essay in the Prison Notebooks, but was
treated in scattered snippets of essays devoted to other
topics and can often be difficult to understand and piece
together, commentators have offered a number of useful
recapitulations of the concept. 238 To help clarify the concept,
I offer the following summary from Carl Boggs, which is
often quoted in discussions of Gramsci's conceptualization
of hegemony:
By hegemony Gramsci meant the permeation throughout civil
society-including a whole range of structures and activities like
trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family-of an entire
system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one
way or another supportive of the established order and the class
interests that dominate it. Hegemony in this sense might be
defined as an 'organizing principle', or world-view (or combination
of such world-views), that is diffused by agencies of ideological
control and socialization into every area of daily life. To the extent
that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad
234. WILLIAMS, supra note 233,

at 113-14.

235. Id. at 113-14; see also PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 333,

365-66.
236. See BOGGS, supra note 211, at 40-42; PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note
210, at 59, 60-61, 388; see also IVES, supra note 2, at 68 (indicating that Gramsci

never used the term "counter-hegemony" and noting "confusion about the extent
to which Gramsci advocates hegemony").
237. WILLIAMS, supra note 233, at 113-14.

238. See IVES, supra note 2, at 64-67; Kennedy, supra note 211, at 33;
Litowitz, supranote 211, at 523.
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masses, it becomes part of 'common sense'; as all ruling elites seek
to perpetuate their power, wealth, and status, they necessarily
attempt to popularize their own philosophy, culture, morality, etc.
and render them unchallengeable, part of the natural order of
things. For hegemony to assert itself successfully in any society,
therefore, it must operate in a dualistic manner: as a 'general
conception of life' for the masses, and as a 'scholastic programme'
or set of principles which is advanced by a sector of the
intellectuals.
...Where hegemony appeared as strong force, it fulfilled a role
that guns and tanks could never perform. It mystified power
relations, public issues, and events; it encouraged a sense of
fatalism and passivity towards political action; and it justified
every type of system-serving sacrifice and deprivation. In short,
to accept
hegemony worked in many ways to induce the oppressed
2 39
or 'consent' to their own exploitation and daily misery.

Before leaving our brief introduction to the Gramscian

concept of hegemony, I would like to spend a few lines
describing the role that law plays in hegemonic activity.
Although Gramsci devoted scant attention to the law in his
Prison Notebooks, 240 he did contemplate that it would play
an important role in advancing the ideological hegemony of
the dominant group. 241 Gramsci conceptualized the law's
role as follows:
If every State tends to create and maintain a certain type of
civilisation and of citizen (and hence of collective life and of
individual relations), and to eliminate certain customs and
attitudes and to disseminate others, then the Law will be its
instrument for this purpose (together with the school system, and
other institutions and activities). It must be developed so that it is
that it is maximally effective and
suitable for such a purpose--so
24 2
productive of positive results.

We can see in this passage that Gramsci envisioned the
law as playing a dual role that corresponds to the notions of

239. BOGGS, supra note 211, at 39-40. For other recapitulations, see
WILLIAMS, supra note 233, at 108; Kennedy, supra note 211, at 32; and Litowitz,
supra note 211, at 519.
240. Kennedy, supra note 211, at 35; Litowitz, supra note 211, at 530.
241. See Greer, supra note 214, at 308.

242. PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 246.
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"domination" and "hegemony. '243 Obviously, the law
furthers "domination" through its repressive function of
punishing those who fail to conform to the norms
promulgated by the dominant group. 244 At the same time,
however, the law furthers the ideological hegemony of the
dominant group by serving an assimilationist/educational
function:
This problem contains in a nutshell the entire "juridical problem",
i.e. the problem of assimilating the entire grouping to its most
advanced fraction; it is a problem of education of the masses, of
their "adaptation" in accordance with the requirements of the goal
to be achieved. This is precisely the function of law in the State
and in society; through "law" the State renders the ruling group
"homogeneous", and tends to create a social conformism
which is
2 45
useful to the ruling group's line of development.

In this regard, Gramsci saw the influence of the law as
extending beyond the area of positive law and into general
notions of morality and customs, allowing the "leadership"
of the dominant group to be brought to bear even in areas
where 6 people feel that their actions are spontaneous and
free. 24
B. Viewing Tax Equity Through the Lens of Gramscian
Hegemony
The concept of tax equity is part of the "entire system of
values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc. that is in one way or
another supportive of the established order."247 Cloaked in a
mantle of positive connotations, tax equity is viewed as an
indisputable good: "Equity is good. No one argues that an
equitable state is morally or functionally flawed." 248 Even
when not stated quite so forthrightly, we often see equity
described as one of the hallmarks of a "good" tax system or
of "good" tax policy. 249 Equity has thus become part of our
243. See Litowitz, supra note 211, at 530.
244. See PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 247.
245. Id. at 195; see also id. at 247, 258.
246. See id. at 195-96; Litowitz, supra note 211, at 530.
247. BOGGS, supra note 211, at 39.

248. Donaldson, supra note 26, at 739-40 (footnotes omitted).
249. E.g., Ellen P. Aprill

& Richard Schmalbeck,

Post-Disaster Tax
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tax "common sense"; it seems nearly "unchallengeable, [a]
part of the natural order of things. '250 In fact, the concept is
so fundamental to our "world-view" of tax that many of our
basic tax textbooks begin by introducing (indoctrinating?)
law students
to the desirability of striving for an "equitable"
251
tax system.
To achieve this ideological hegemony, the dominant
group (i.e., economically privileged, able-bodied, straight,
white males) 2 52 has had to make sacrifices; however, as
Legislation:A Series of Unfortunate Events, 56 DUKE L.J. 51, 55 (2006) (stating
"the standard criteria for good tax policy: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and
economic efficiency"); Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIz.
L. REV. 739, 747 (1995) ("While the hallmarks of a good tax system have
included as many as seven different criteria, the many criteria are often
reduced to the three broad categories of equity, efficiency, and simplicity."
(footnotes omitted)); John F. Coverdale, Missing Persons: Children in the Tax
Treatment of Marriage, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 475, 511 (1998) ("In future
work, I hope to put forward concrete proposals for favorable tax treatment of
married couples with children that meet the internal design criteria of a good
tax system (horizontal and vertical equity, administrability, etc.) and yet
accommodate other social goals."); Eric J. Gouvin, Radical Tax Reform,
Municipal Finance, and the Conservative Agenda, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 409, 414
n.24 (2004) ("Although the exact formulation of the attributes of a good tax
system vary, commentators almost always include 'equity,' 'efficiency,' and
'simplicity,' together with some other attribute or two, which often serves as a
catch-all for other desirable aspects of a tax system."); Kahn, supra note 7, at
649 ("The principles of horizontal and vertical equity and parallelism are among
the myriad goals of a good tax system ....");Jeffrey A. Maine, Linking Limited
Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of the ALI Reporters' Study on the
Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U. Pirr. L. REV. 223, 268 (2000)
("aiming for equity and economic efficiency, important criteria for good tax
policy"); Katherine Pratt, The Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World,
53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1098 (2000) ("The goals of a good tax system include
efficiency and equity."); Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV.
45, 92 (1990) ("[E]quity is not the only criterion of good tax policy.").
250. BOGGS, supra note 211, at 39.
251. See supra note 3.
252. Not coincidentally, the tax law professoriate is overwhelmingly (i.e.,
80%) male (and slightly more overwhelmingly male than the law professoriate
on the whole), overwhelmingly (i.e., 91.16%) white (and, again, slightly more
overwhelmingly white than the law professoriate on the whole), Eric A. Lustig,
Who We Are: An Empirical Study of the Tax Law Professoriate,1 PIT. TAX REV.
85, 95-97 (2003), and overwhelmingly (i.e., 98.25%) straight, Infanti, supra note
113, at 768 n.19. To the extent that these overwhelmingly straight, white, and
male tax law professors also proceed from economically privileged backgrounds,
they may be counted among the "organic intellectuals" of the dominant group,
facilitating that group's ideological hegemony over other social groups. See
PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 10, 12, 14 (referring to the intellectuals
who proceed from, and are connected with, a social group as that group's

2008]

TAX EQUITY

1251

expected, those sacrifices have occurred only at the
margins. In particular, our tax system has consistentlyalbeit controversially-embraced the idea that the income
tax burden ought to be progressive in nature, meaning that
the amount of tax paid should increase as a taxpayer's
income increases. 253 The visible face of progressivity in our
income tax system is the graduated rate structure, which,
with nominal rates proceeding in five steps from 10% to
35%, appears to exact an increasing proportion of an
individual's income as that income rises. 254 But, again,
appearances may be deceiving. As commentators have
noted, "there are a number of reasons why nominal rate
structures may not reflect the actual distribution of the tax
burden," not the least of which is tinkering by Congress
with the tax base "to exclude many items included in most

"organic intellectuals"); see also EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 11 (Vintage
Books 1979) ("For if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human
sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as a human
subject in his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European
or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main
circumstances of his actuality: that he comes up against the Orient as a
European or American first, as an individual second. And to be a European or
an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact."); cf. Jose
Gabilondo, Asking the Straight Question: How to Come to Speech in Spite of
Conceptual Liquidation as a Homosexual, 21 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 32-36 (2006)
(exploring the role of lesbian and gay "organic intellectuals" in countering
heteronormativity). Even if they do not proceed from economically privileged
backgrounds, these tax law professors have been elevated to an economically
privileged status by entering the legal profession and the law professoriate-a
status that sets them above and apart from their organic social group and
renders them "traditional" intellectuals who are open to assimilation. See
PRISON NOTEBOOKS, supra note 210, at 14-15. For an interesting discussion of
how these different axes of (dis)advantage form an interlocking and mutually
reinforcing system of subordination and how political conservatives have
exploited a "discourse of distinctness" (i.e., disregarding the overlap of the
different axes of discrimination) to stymie intergroup coalitions aimed at
progressive reform, see Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis:
Mechanisms of Mutual Support Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L.
REV. 251 (2002).

253. See supra notes 5-6; see also Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith,
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75
CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1906 (1987) ("A progressive rate structure has been part of
the federal income tax system since its inception in 1913. Notwithstanding its
lineage, the progressive rate structure has always been controversial, and the
degree of progressivity has been subject to constant, and occasionally radical,
change." (footnote omitted)).
254. See Rev. Proc. 2006-53, § 3.01, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996.
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economic definitions of income. 2 55 Although it can be
difficult to determine whether the tax burden is progressive
in practice and not just in appearance, it has been said that
"[m]ost analysts ... believe the effective federal income tax
rate structure is progressive, although not as progressive as
the nominal rate structure. '256 Furthermore, as had been
observed just a few years before this statement was made,
when other sources of federal revenue are also taken into
account, a noticeable shift occurred between 1969 and 1983
away from more progressive forms of taxation (e.g., the
income tax and the estate and gift taxes) and toward more
regressive forms of taxation (e.g., payroll taxes). 257 Indeed,
a recent study that covered individual and corporate income
taxes, estate and gift taxes, and payroll taxes documented a
striking decline in the overall progressivity of the federal
tax system at the highest income levels between 1960 and
2004.258

In return for what has turned out to be a small (and
decreasing) economic sacrifice, the dominant group has
obtained control over the flow of ideas in tax policy debates.
With this control, they are able, with the help of
intellectuals, to channel the tax policy discourse in a
direction that helps to obtain the consent of other groups to
their own subordination. To this end, the dominant group
has taken a concept (i.e., equity) that, at least in the
255. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 253, at 1909.
256. Id. at 1910.
257. See Michael J. Graetz, To Praisethe Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE
L.J. 259, 270 (1983).
258. Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, How Progressive Is the U.S.
Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective, 21 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 22 (2007). Interestingly, the authors note that:
[T]he most dramatic changes in federal tax system progressivity almost
always take place within the top 1 percent of income earners, with
relatively small changes occurring below the top percentile. For
example, many of the recent tax provisions that are currently hotly
debated in Congress, such as whether there should be a permanent
reduction in tax rates for capital gains and dividends, or whether the
estate tax should be repealed, affect primarily the top percentile of the
distribution-or even just an upper slice of the top percentile. This
pattern strongly suggests that, in contrast to the standard political
economy model, the progressivity of the current tax system is not being
shaped by the self-interest of the median voter.
Id. at 23.
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abstract, cannot help but evoke positive feelings and has
made it even more appealing to academics by nearly
eliminating its one potentially objectionable aspect: its
inherent subjectivity. As we have seen, the entire idea of
what counts as an "equitable" tax system has been
constructed on and around "neutral" and "objective"
economic factors. Though cynics might be wary that equity
is open to manipulation because it is an "empty idea," 259 the
tax version of equity seems to have allayed these concerns
for most through its reliance on purely "neutral" and
"objective" economic factors. Notwithstanding any leeway
that persists with regard to the choice of relevant economic
factors to include in the tax equity formula, 260 this version
of equity ("Equity
2.0"?) undoubtedly benefits from an aura
261
of scientificity.
This scientificity also furnishes ready and plausible
reasons to academics for not addressing concerns associated
with race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, disability,
and other axes of subordination in the tax arena. In
practice, it works even more effectively by rendering any
mention of these subjects in a tax context immediately
suspect. 262 But how can the discussion of sexual orientation,
to take the axis of discrimination with which I am most
intimately familiar, be considered suspect when the federal
government has taken tax dollars, including the tax dollars
of lesbians and gay men, to (1) deny legal recognition to
same-sex relationships for all purposes of federal law under
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act-an injunction that
has been taken so far as to deny a lesbian U.S. citizen a
passport because her application listed not her maiden
name, but her name as changed on her marriage license

259. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HIARV. L.
REV. 537 (1982).

260. See supra text accompanying note 7.
261. See generally Hamill, supra note 118,

at 731-34

(describing how

economics is used to lend an air of scientific certainty to the claim that tax cuts
for the wealthy will ultimately benefit everyone).
262. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. In conversation, Dorothy
Brown has remarked to me that you simply cannot talk about race with tax
academics. See also Brown, supra note 63, at 808 ("[Mlany of those same
academics are quite skeptical-even hostile-to the idea that race (and in
certain instances gender) can ever be relevant when discussing tax policy.").
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when she married her partner in Massachusetts; 263 (2)
require those whose same-sex relationships are legally
recognized under state law to incur unnecessary legal and
other expenses in an effort to replicate that legal
recognition in a way that will be recognized by other states,
again because of the Defense of Marriage Act; 264 (3) until
2002, prevent the District of Columbia from implementing
the domestic partnership regime that it had enacted in
1992;265 (4) amend the District of Columbia's Human Rights
Act to allow Georgetown University to refuse to recognize
lesbian and gay student groups despite a court ruling to the
contrary; 266 (5) actively engage in employment discrimination
against lesbians and gay men through its "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy; 26 7 and (6) provide rather precarious protections
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to
its other employees? 268 If "what counts as justice in taxation
cannot be determined without considering how government
allocates its resources," 269 then discussion of sexual

263. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); Dianne Williamson, Gay Right Springs a Leak,
SUNDAY TELEGRAM (Worcester, MA), Mar. 4, 2007, at B1. For further discussion,
see ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS (AND THOSE

WHO CARE ABOUT THEM), ch. 6 (2007).
264. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738c (2000). For further discussion, see INFANTI, supra
note 263, at chs. 6-8.
265. Compare Act of Dec. 21, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-96, § 118, 115 Stat. 923,
950, with Act of Oct. 5, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-382, 106 Stat. 1422, 1422.
266. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-168,
§ 141, 103 Stat. 1267, 1284 (1989) (codified at D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41(3)
(LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2007)).
267. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000). For further discussion, see INFANTI, supra
note 263, at ch. 4.
268. It is worth noting that the Bush Administration has been less than
enthusiastic about enforcing these protections and, through executive order, has
actually ended the unequivocal prohibition of discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation in the granting of security clearances that the Clinton
Administration had put in place. See Christopher Lee, Groups Applaud
Discrimination Ban, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2004, at A3 (discussing the
administration's resistance to enforcing prohibitions against discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation for federal employees). Compare Memorandum
from Stephen J. Hadley, Assistant to the President for Nat'l Sec. Affairs, to
William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office,
12 (Sept. 29, 2005),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/guidelines.pdf, with Exec. Order No.
12,968, § 3.1(c)-(d), 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,250 (Aug. 7, 1995). For further
discussion, see INFANTI, supra note 263, at ch. 5.

269. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 4, at 14.
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orientation (as well as other axes of subordination) is
plainly in order. To use the cover of "neutrality" and
"objectivity" to create a presumption that such discussion is
irrelevant or improper serves only to advance the
ideological hegemony of the dominant group. This
presumption makes it easier to co-opt, neutralize, or
diminish the alternative or oppositional ideas put forward
by critical scholars-many of which, as we have already
explored at length, were shaped by this specific hegemony
to begin with. In short, the presumption works to both
solidify and obscure the dominant group's control over
subordinated groups.
The influence of this construction of tax equity is also
felt beyond the confines of legal academia. By isolating
economic factors as the sole permissible topic for discussion,
the dominant group has shifted the political debate over
taxation away from the potentially difficult topics of race,
gender, sexual orientation, disability, and other forms of
invidious discrimination and toward a topic that it can
easily manipulate and turn to its own advantage-economic
class. For instance, when signing the Tax Reform Act of
1986 into law, President Reagan mentioned fairness six
times in his short remarks and repeatedly invoked
individualism and the Protestant work ethic-both of which
are routinely used to justify group-based social inequality 27 0in support of the flattening of tax rates:
But for all tax reform's economic benefits, I believe that history
will record this moment as something more: as the return to the
first principles. This country was founded on faith in the
individual, not groups or classes, but faith in the resources and
bounty of each and every separate human soul. Our Founding

Fathers designed a democratic form of government to enlist the
individual's energies and fashioned a Bill of Rights to protect its
freedoms. And in so doing, they tapped a wellspring of hope and
creativity that was to completely transform history.

270. Sidanius and Pratto have identified "notions of individual
responsibility" and the Protestant work ethic as among the most subtle, yet
most important "hierarchy-enhancing [legitimizing myths]" in the United
States. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 173, at 45-46. "Legitimizing myths" are
"attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that provide moral and
intellectual justification for the social practices that distribute social value
within the social system." Id. at 45. Such myths are "hierarchy-enhancing" if
they "justify and support group-based social inequality .... " Id. at 45-46.

1256

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

As tax rates escalated, the Tax Code grew ever more tangled
and complex .... Blatantly unfair, our Tax Code became a source
of bitterness and discouragement for the average taxpayer. It
wasn't too much to call it un-American.
Meanwhile, the steeply progressive nature of the tax struck at the
heart of the economic life of the individual, punishing that special
effort and extra hard work that has always been the driving force
of our economy ....
Throughout history, the oppressive hand of government has
fallen most heavily on the economic life of the individuals .... We
should not forget that this nation of ours began in a revolt against
oppressive taxation. Our Founding Fathers fought not only for our
political rights but also to secure the economic freedoms without
which these political freedoms are no more than a shadow.
In the last 20 years we've witnessed an expansion and
strengthening of many of our civil liberties, but our economic
liberties have too often been neglected and even abused. We protect
the freedom of expression of the author, as we should, but what of
the freedom of expression of the entrepreneur, whose pen and
paper are capital and profits, whose book may be a new invention
or small business? What of the creators of our economic life, whose
contributions may not only delight the mind but improve the
condition of man by feeding the poor with new grains, bringing
ignorance with
hope to the sick with new cures, vanishing
271
wondrous new information technologies?

As Marjorie Kornhauser has commented, "[t]his is
rhetoric, but in the bad sense of the word. It seeks to
persuade through bombast and confusion ....*"272 In the
quoted passages, President Reagan flatly dismisses the
relevance of group-based considerations, wraps the wealthy
in gauzy talk of the American dream, and manages to turn
the economically privileged into a subordinated group.
After more than six years of the Bush Administration's
273
championing tax cuts that greatly benefit the wealthy,
we now have at our disposal a veritable bounty of examples
271. Remarks on Signing H.R. 3838 into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.

1423, 1424 (Oct. 22, 1986) (emphasis added).
272. Kornhauser, supra note 37, at 476.
273. See Hamill, supra note 118, at 711-26.
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of rhetoric that seeks to justify these tax cuts by exploiting
the unbending focus on the economic dimension of
individuals in political discussions of tax fairness. Thus, we
' 274
are told that (1) "every American who pays income taxes
should benefit from tax reductions-even though that group
includes the economically privileged and excludes those
among the working poor who do not pay income taxes, but
who do pay payroll taxes; 275 (2) conversely, providing tax
relief to those too poor to pay income taxes (but who pay
other taxes) is equivalent to sending them a welfare
check;276 (3) "the American people should keep more of their
own money" 277-which plays into the misleading "everyday
libertarian" notion that "all taxation takes what belongs to
us; what we are fundamentally entitled to is our pretax
incomes";278 (4) eliminating the estate tax makes the tax
laws fairer for small businesses and family farms 279-which
contributes to the impression that the estate tax applies to
a broad spectrum of taxpayers across a range of wealth
levels when, in fact, it only applies to a tiny (and currently
decreasing) fraction of wealthy decedents' estates, an
impression that is designed to help foment "grassroots"
support for elimination of the despised "death tax";280
274. Remarks on Signing the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation
Act of 2005, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 943, 944 (May 17, 2006) [hereinafter
TIPRA 2005 Remarks]; see also Remarks on Signing the Economic Growth and
Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 858 (June 7,
2001) ("We cut taxes for every income tax payer. We target nobody in; we target
nobody out. And tax relief is now on the way.") [hereinafter EGTRRA 2001
Remarks].
275. See Lipman, supra note 11, at 56.
276. See Brown, supranote 79, at 804-05.
277. TIPRA 2005 Remarks, supra note 274, at 945; see also Remarks on
Signing the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, 39 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 666, 667-68 (May 28, 2003) (containing a number of similar
statements).
278. MURPHY & NAGEL, supranote 4, at 35.
279. EGTRRA 2001 Remarks, supra note 274, at 858-59.
280. Estate- and gift-tax critics maintain that abolishing transfer taxes
will benefit all Americans, from farmers to small businessmen, from
retired old economy workers to new economy professionals. A vote
against repeal is a vote against average citizens. In criticizing Bill
Clinton's veto of H.R. 8, for example, Speaker of the House Dennis
Hastert, R-Ill., stated that the president "disappointed millions of
Americans who worry that a lion's share of their life's work will be
passed on to the Internal Revenue Service rather than left to families."
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(5) progressive tax rates are "soaking the rich" by
disproportionately imposing the burden of funding
government on an ever smaller group of wealthy and
successful individuals even though "everyone in this
country is in it together" and should be contributing their
fair share 28 '-suffice it to say that the basis for this
argument, which cannot be untangled in this short space,
has been described as "profoundly dishonest"; 28 2 (6) in a
related argument, continuing to soak the rich is
unsustainable over the long term because it will put the
nation's economy at risk (whether because of the tax
system's resulting susceptibility to an economic downturn
2 3
or simply because the rich will decide to stop working) an argument that has rightly been labeled a "scare
tactic[ ]";284 and (7) in an argument related to both of the
last two, merely mentioning the possibility of raising taxes
on the wealthy is labeled "class warfare"-which effectively
paints those at the bottom of the economic ladder (as well
as those who advocate on their behalf) as violent
aggressors. 28 5 Of course, I could go on, but I think that I
Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Straight Talk About the 'Death' Tax: Politics, Economics,
and Morality, 89 TAX NOTES 1159, 1160 (2000) (footnote omitted); see also id.
("[T]he editors at The Wall Street Journal claim that 'estate-tax repeal has
rolled over the political class on a wave of grassroots support, notably from
farmers and small business, but also from average folks who think it's unfair to
confiscate the fruits of a lifetime of hard work."'); id. at 1161 ("Seventeen
percent of those surveyed by Gallup in June indicated that they would
'personally benefit' from the elimination of inheritance taxes. But less than 2
percent of all estates passing to heirs in any given year pay transfer taxes."); id.
at 1163 (In the context of estate tax repeal, "[t]he 'true winners' ...
are
extremely wealthy families. Philanthropist George Soros recently argued, 'The
truth is that repealing the estate tax would give a huge tax windfall to the
wealthiest 2 percent of Americans ....
For the rest of the public, it is a cruel
hoax."'); CITIZENS FOR TA JUSTICE, WHO PAID THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX IN 2005?
1 (2007), available at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/wherethemoneygoes.pdf (indicating
that the 18,431 estate tax returns filed in 2005 showing a taxable estate
comprised only 0.8% of the people who died in 2004).
281. See Ari Fleischer, The Taxpaying Minority, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2007,
at A15.
282. Neil H. Buchanan, Is It Really So Tough to Be Rich? The New, Brazen,
and Completely Dishonest Attack on Progressive Taxation, http://writ.lp.find
law.com/commentary/20070423_buchanan.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
283. J.T. Young, Outer Limits of Class Warfare, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002,
at A17; see also Fleischer, supra note 281 (making a similar argument).
284. Paul Krugman, Losing Our Country, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at A21.
285. See id.; Lori Montgomery, Democrats Craft New Tax Rules, New Image,
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have made my point that, as expected, the dominant
group's construction of the concept of tax equity influences
not only legal academic, but also everyday political debates
about what constitutes "fair" treatment of taxpayers.
Overall, the concept of tax equity has a particularly
hegemonic quality. Despite a series of otherwise
devastating critiques, tax academics still turn to the
concept in a casual, almost offhand manner for help in
grappling with questions of tax fairness. Many of us also
teach our students to think of the Code in tax equity terms
from the earliest days of their introduction to the tax laws.
The concept's seemingly universal appeal has even lulled
critical tax scholars into framing their tax policy analyses
in tax equity terms. Yet, notwithstanding its natural
appeal, tax equity is far from a benign metric for gauging
the fairness of our tax system. Rather, it insidiously shapes
our thinking about tax fairness by tacitly singling out
economic factors-to the exclusion of all others, no matter
how relevant or worthy of discussion they may be. By
packaging this very partial version of fairness in a way that
gives it universal appeal, the dominant group has quite
effectively been able to maintain its power and privilege by
avoiding discussions that could result in "radical" proposals
that might actually deliver on the promise of fairness in
taxation to a much broader swath of society.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

As I mentioned at the beginning of this Article, my
purpose in undertaking this project 28 6 is to raise critical
(and even mainstream) scholars' consciousness of the
subtle, yet pernicious ways in which framing our tax policy
analyses in tax equity terms can shape the results of those
analyses. My goal has been to create some skepticism
among all tax scholars-both "mainstream" and criticalabout the "naturalness" of this idea 287 and to get them to
WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2007, at Al; Ben Stein, In Class Warfare, Guess Which
Class Is Winning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, § 3, at 3.

286. As I also mentioned at the outset of this Article, this is a project that
began with an earlier article debunking the artificial distinction between
"mainstream" and "marginal" tax scholars. See supranote 17.
287. And, given the larger project, I hope that tax scholars will similarly
begin to question the "naturalness" of other ideas that are treated as
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think about how it may influence their thinking in
unexpected ways. 28 8 Eventually, I hope that this
questioning will lead tax scholars to forge competing ideas
about what makes a tax fair or just so that we can break
the ideological hold of the concept of tax equity and replace
it with something more meaningful that addresses the
impact of taxation not only on the dominant group but also
89
on all of the subordinated groups in our society. 2

conventional wisdom in tax policy circles. See supranote 17.
288. See BOGGS, supra note 211, at 41.
289. See id. at 40-42. Again, by extension, I hold out this same hope with
regard to other ideas that are treated as normal, natural, and incontrovertible
in tax policy circles. See supra note 287.

